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Abstract
More and more devices connect to the internet, this means that a lot
sensitive information will be stored in various networks. In order to secure
this information and manage the large amount of inevitable network traffic
that these devices create, an optimised firewall is needed.
In order to meet this demand, the thesis proposes two algorithms for
solving the problem. The first algorithm will minimise the rule matching
time by using a simple condition for performing swapping that both
preserves the firewall consistency, the firewall integrity and ensures a
greedy reduction of the matching time.
The solution is novel in itself and can be considered as a generalisation
of the algorithm proposed by Fulp in the paper ’Optimization of network
firewall policies using ordered sets and directed acyclical graphs’.
The second algorithm will read the network traffic and provide network
statistics to the first algorithm. The solution is a novel modification of the
algorithm by Oommen and Rueda in the paper ’Stochastic learning-based
weak estimation of multinomial random variables and its applications to
pattern recognition in non-stationary environments’.
It will be shown that both algorithms, through experiments, are able to
satisfy the problem of optimising a firewall.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As our society becomes more dependant on the interconnectivity offered by
the internet as well as the convenience of digital services, so does our need
to secure the information stored on these devices and services. Thus, in
order to secure the information, computer security becomes an important
problem to solve.
However, while computer security is an extensive subject and covers both
the security of the physical machines as well as the information stored
on them, a more specialised form of computer security is needed, the
reason being that more and more devices connect to various networks,
chief among them the internet [1]. Thus, network security is the branch
concerned with the security in a network; this is a broad field spanning
many different concepts such as authentication, access policies, intrusion
detection, intrusion prevention and honeypots/honeynets.
A first line of defence in network security is to use a firewall in order
to enforce access policies. A firewall, in essence, is a program whose
objective is to filter the incoming and outgoing packet traffic on a host
or in a network. This is enforced by matching each data packets header
information against a predefined set of rules known as the firewall policy.
Each rule has an action associated with it, either deny or accept, and this
action is what decides whether a packet is dropped or not.
A study of many Internet and private traces shows that the major portion
of network traffic matches a small subset of firewall rules, which means
that the frequency distribution for some of the traffic properties appears
to be highly skewed [2]. Furthermore, when performing packet filtering,
each rule in a firewall policy will usually be checked in a sequential order,
thus, as the firewall policy increases in size, and combined with a matching
rule of a higher order, the firewall filtering overhead will become more
costly.
This can easily become a bottleneck in a high speed network under attack or
heavy network load [3, 4]. Morover, as the computing power of hosts, the
transmission speeds of packets and the complexity of networks continue
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to increase; a firewall must correlatively be able to adapt to this change by
processing packets at increasingly higher speeds [5, 6]. Because of this, it
is desirable to decrease the number of packet matches required in order to
reduce a potentially costly filtering overhead as well as the overall packet
matching time [2].
Thus, in order reduce the number of required packet matches and ensure
that a firewall is able to process packets at an adequate speed, it is crucial
to optimise the firewall to have an appropriate rule ordering. This can be
achieved by ensuring that the rule ordering is such that the rules most often
matched appear at the top of the rules list.
This will reduce the amount of time used to process a packet by reducing
the amount of required packet matches, thereby, reducing the packet
filtering overhead. Additionally, it will also have the effect of improving
throughput of the network as a packet will spend less time being
processed.
However, because of intra-rule dependencies, the problem of finding the
optimal rule order is NP-hard, thus, one must find a heuristic algorithm to
find a sub-optimal rule order.
1.1 Problem Statement
At its core, this thesis aims to find a solution to the problem of optimising
the performance of a firewall in a dynamic network, and in order to do so, it
attempts to answer the following questions:
• How can we optimise the order of the firewall rules in order to cope with
dynamic network traffic statistics?
The term optimising in the problem statement is a common concept in the
field of computer science. It is generally used to describe improvements
done to various facets of the field such as programs or infrastructures. The
improvements constitutes ameliorating them to run more efficiently or to
improve resource use. Often, a compromise between these requirements
is needed in order to reach a predefined optimisation goal based on the
available hardware and software.
A dynamic network can be described as a network under constant change
and activity. Essentially, it is a network where the state of packet traffic is
not static, but rather dynamic in that the packet traffic will fluctuate so that
one type of traffic won’t be dominant for an extended period of time.
The performance of a program can be defined as the amount of work
executed in relation to the time and resources used. While network traffic
statistics describes the statistics about the current state of a network such as
the number of packets passing through it and their various protocols, ports
being used, the latency or the throughput.
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Consolidating the above terms in relation to a firewall, the problem
statement asks for a solution in which a firewalls performance is optimised
by sorting the access control rules according statistics taken from the
network such that the firewall is able to adapt to the dynamic nature of
the network.
3
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter outlines the current state of progress regarding firewall
optimisation as well as introducing several concepts, technologies and
applications used in this thesis.
2.1 Firewalls
According to the Request For Comment, Benchmarking Terminology for
Firewall Performance (RFC 2647) by David Newman [7], a firewall is defined
as "a device or group of devices that enforces an access control policy
between networks". Firewalls are thus, devices or programs that control
the flow of network traffic between networks or hosts [8].
2.1.1 Rules and Packets
In order to understand how a firewall operates it is necessary to understand
the relationship between access control rules and the packets they govern.
This subsection gives a formal explanation of the terms.
A firewall rule, r, is defined as an n-tuple of ordered fields:
r = (r[1], . . . , r[n]), for n > 1
The upper bound of n is network specific, however, for an internet firewall
it is usually set to five and comprises the following fields: Protocol, Source
Address, Source Port, Destination Address, Destination Port [2, 9, 10].
Each rule has an action field associated with it, the value of the field decides
what actions the firewall will take when a match is found. Table 2.1 outlines
the values of the action field.
The Protocol field specifies a protocol as documented in the IP packet
headers protocol field, Internet Protocol (RFC 791). For an internet firewall,
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Action Effect
Accept Forward the packet
Deny Drop the packet
Log, Accept Log and forward the packet
Log, Deny Log and drop the packet
Table 2.1: The action field values and its effects
this would be either TCP, UDP or ICMP, however, it could also contain
a wild card value (*), in which case it will match any protocol [8, 9, 11,
12]. The Address and Port fields specify the source and destination IP
addresses and the source and destination port numbers of incoming and
outgoing packets. Both of these fields can be configured to represent a
range of values or any value, rather than only one value. Tables 2.3 and
2.2 outlines these types of configurations for the address and port fields
respectively.
Notation Example Explanation
Wild Card * or any Port range 0 - 65535
Range 90-94 The given range of port numbers
Single 90 A single given port number
Table 2.2: Notation for the port field in a firewall rule
Notation Example Explanation
CIDR 192.0.2.0/24 Address range 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
Wild Card 192.0.* Address range 192.0.0.0 - 192.0.255.255
Range 192.0.2.2 - 192.0.2.150 The given range of addresses
Single 192.0.2.2 A single given IP address
Table 2.3: Notation for the address field in a firewall rule
A data packet, p, is defined as an n-tuple of ordered parameters:
p = (p[1], . . . , p[n]), for n > 1
The upper bound of n is limited by the fields defined in the Internet Protocol
(RFC 791) [11], however, not all fields in the IP header is of importance for
a firewall. Thus, a data packet as seen by a firewall is comprised mainly of
the following fields [2, 9, 10]:
1. Protocol
2. Source Address IP
3. Source PORT
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4. Destination Address IP
5. Destination PORT
These fields correspond to the fields a firewall rule is comprised of.
2.1.2 Firewall Policies
A firewall security policy defines how an organisations firewalls should
handle inbound and outbound network traffic based on the organisations
information security policies. Generally an organisations should conduct
risk analysis in order to discover what types of traffic passes through its
networks at all times and then how to secure it; a firewall security policy is
the implementation of such an analysis [8].
Examples of policy requirements include accepting only necessary IP
[11] protocols to pass, authorised source and destination IP addresses,
autorised TCP and UDP ports to be used, and certain ICMP types and
codes to be used [8].
A formal definition of a firewall policy can be defined thus, let
R = {r1, r2, r3, . . . , rN}, for N > 1
be the set of ordered firewall rules comprising a policy.
Generally, all inbound and outbound traffic not expressly permitted by the
firewall policy should be blocked because such traffic is not needed by the
organisation. This practice can also have the benefit of reducing the risk
of attacks and decreasing the volume of traffic carried on the organisations
networks [8].
Such a firewall policy is considered to be comprehensive if any packet, p,
has a match in R. In practice, this is achieved by implementing a Default
Rule [2, 8]. A default rule is a catch-all rule. It is usually added to end
of a policy and is designed such that it will simply discard any packet
not matched in the above rules. Table 2.4 shows an implementation of a
comprehensive firewall security policy.
7
Source Destination
No. Proto. IP PORT IP PORT Action Prob.
1 UDP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.0556
2 UDP 190.1.1.* * * 90-94 deny 0.0556
3 UDP 190.1.2.* * * * deny 0.0556
4 UDP 190.1.1.2 * * 94 accept 0.0556
5 TCP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.0556
6 TCP 190.1.1.* * * 88 deny 0.0556
7 TCP 190.1.1.2 * * 88-94 deny 0.0556
8 TCP 190.1.2.* * * * accept 0.0556
9 TCP * * 161.120.33.41 25 accept 0.0556
10 TCP 140.192.37.30 * * 21 deny 0.0556
11 TCP * * 161.120.33.* 21 deny 0.0556
12 TCP 140.192.37.* * * 21 accept 0.0556
13 TCP * * 161.120.33.* 22 accept 0.0556
14 TCP 140.192.37.* * * 80 deny 0.0556
15 TCP * * 161.120.33.40 80 accept 0.0556
16 TCP * * 161.120.33.43 53 accept 0.0556
17 UDP * * 161.120.33.43 53 accept 0.0556
18 * * * * * deny 0.0556
Table 2.4: A firewall security policy configuration with equal initial
probabilities
2.1.3 Packet Matching
In many implementations of firewalls, the rules are stored internally as
linked lists [10], thus, a firewall will generally, sequentially compare a
packet with a rule. In order for there to be a match between a rule, ri and
a packet, p, the parameters of the packet header must be a subset of all the
corresponding fields in the rule.
If,
ri[l], for l = 1 . . . n
p[l], for l = 1 . . . n
represents the ordered fields of the rule ri and the ordered parameters of the
packet header for packet p, then the match between rule ri and the packet
p can be denoted as,
p⇒ ri ⇐⇒ ∀ l, p[l] ⊂ r[l], for l = 1 . . . n
p matches ri if and only if the parameters of p is a subset of the fields of
ri. Because each parameter p[li] must match the corresponding field ri[lj],
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the order of fields in a rule is important to the matching process. Thus, a
packet, p can match multiple rules in a firewall R. The matching policy of
the firewall decides which rule a packet will match. There are generally
three common matching policies used, Best Match, Last Match and First
Match [13]
Best Match
A packet is compared against all ri ∈ R, the rule that matches the closest
with the packet is selected and its action consequently executed.
Last Match
A packet is sequentially compared to each rule ri ∈ R, the last rule
that matches, p ⇒ ri ∈ R, is selected and its action consequently
executed.
First Match
A packet is sequentially compared to each rule ri ∈ R, the First rule
that matches, p ⇒ ri ∈ R, is selected and its action consequently
executed.
Both Best Match and potentially Last Match will increase the packet
matching time, thus, in this thesis, a First Match matching policy is
assumed.
2.2 Firewall Modelling and Policy Anomalies
This section outlines how to model a firewall and what policy anomalies
are.
2.2.1 Rule Intersection
As stated in subsection 2.1.1, the parameter of a rule can contain a range
of values, this means that multiple rules can intersect. Two rules, ri and rj,
intersect if a comparison of their ordered parameters gives a nonempty set;
this can be denoted as,
ri ∩ rj 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ ∀l, ri[l] ∩ rj[l] 6= ∅, for l = 1 . . . n
Table 2.5 shows an example of this.
9
Source Destination
No. Proto. IP PORT IP PORT Action
1 UDP 190.1.* * * 90 accept
2 UDP 190.1.1.* * * 90-94 deny
3 TCP 140.192.37.30 * 161.120.33.40 80 deny
Table 2.5: Intersecting and non-intersecting rules
Rule 1 and 2 intersect because rule 2 is a subnet in rule 1 and the port in
rule 1 is a subset of the ports in rule 2, in other words, the intersection of
rule 1 and 2 yields the the following non-empty set,
{190.1.1.0− 190.1.1.255, 0− 65535, 0.0.0.0− 255.255.255.255, 90}
Rule 3 is completely separate from the other two rules and does not
intersect with them. The existence of rule intersections in a firewall policy
can limit the amount of valid rule orderings and be the cause of anomalies
in the policy. The latter is discussed in subsection 2.2.3.
2.2.2 Precedence Relationships
As described in section 2.1, a firewall policy is defined as an ordered set
of firewall rules, R, and each packet, p, will be sequentially compared to a
rule, r, like a list. Furthermore, a packet can match multiple rules — this
is evident by the different types of matching policies — which means that
the order of rules are import and should be preserved. If the order is not
preserved when re-ordering the rules and is instead reversed, then a packet
might match the wrong rule and violate the policy integrity.
The integrity of a policy is defined as the original intent of the policy. Thus,
if R is the original firewall security policy and R′ is a reordering of all the
rules in R, then in order to maintain the integrity of the firewall policy R
in R′, a packet, p, must match the same rule and have the same action
executed in R′ as it would in R.
However, it is important to understand that a firewall is not only
comprised of disjoint rules. More often than not, there will be Precedence
Relationships between many of the rules. A precedence relationship is a
connection between two or more rules where a rule must appear before
another in order for the policy integrity to be kept intact. The reasons that
a particular rule should appear before another is further described in the
subsection 2.2.3.
In order to accurately model a firewall policy with relationships, a Directed
Acyclic Graph, DAG G = (R, E), rather than a list, can be used. Here
R represents the set of firewall rules in a policy and E represents the set
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of precedence relationships between rules. Using a DAG to represent a
firewall policy has a couple of advantages over a list representation.
The foremost advantage is that it makes modelling precedence relation-
ships in a firewall easier. Each node in the graph will represent a rule and
each directed edge between two nodes will represent a precedence rela-
tionship. An edge between rules is determined by finding the intersection
between the rules in the firewall, R.
Secondly, the problem of optimising the rule order of a firewall has been
shown to be comparable to that of the single machine job scheduling subject
to precedence constraints problem (see subsection 2.4.1). And because a
DAG model can be used to represent the scheduling problem, it would
be appropriate to use a similar model in order to a model a firewall
policy.
Precedence relationships for table 2.4 are shown in the figure 2.1. The figure
displays a directed acyclic graph, DAG, created of the relationships.
2.2.3 Anomalies
As firewall policies expand and introduce new rules or remove old rules,
the possibility of anomalies occurring in the policy increases [14–16]. In
the paper ‘Modeling and management of firewall policies’ [15], Ehab S Al-
Shaer and Hazem H Hamed outline five types of firewall policy anomalies.
Table 2.6 is an example of a firewall policy with anomalies.
Source Destination
No. Proto. IP PORT IP PORT Action
1 TCP 140.192.37.20 * * 80 deny
2 TCP 140.192.37.* * * 80 accept
3 TCP * * 161.120.33.40 80 accept
4 TCP 140.192.37.* * 161.120.33.40 80 deny
5 TCP 140.192.37.30 * * 21 deny
6 TCP 140.192.37.* * * 21 accept
7 TCP 140.192.37.* * 161.120.33.40 21 accept
8 TCP * * * * deny
9 UDP 140.192.37.* * 161.120.33.40 53 accept
10 UDP * * 161.120.33.40 53 accept
11 UDP 140.192.38.* * 161.120.35.* * accept
12 UDP * * * * deny
Table 2.6: A firewall security policy with anomalies
Shadowing Anomaly A rule is considered to be shadowed if the rule
before it matches all the same packets that this rule matches, thus, the
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Figure 2.1: Direct Acyclic Graph representation of a firewall security policy
shadowed rule would never be activated. Given two rules, ri and rj, rule rj
is considered to be shadowed if the following conditions hold:
• rj follows rule ri in the policy rule order
• ri is a proper superset of rj
Formally, this can be written as
ri < rj ∧ ∀l, ri[l] ⊃ rj[l], for l = 1 . . . n
In the firewall policy given in table 2.6, rule 4 is shadowed by rule 3.
In this example, rule 3 accepts traffic where rule 4 denies it, this could
be a potentially critical error in the policy as the integrity is seemingly
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unsound.
Therefore, according to Al-Shaer and Hamed [15], a general guideline for
two rules in an inclusive or exact match relationship, the superset (or
general) rule should come after the subset (or specific) rule.
Correlation Anomaly Two rules are considered correlated if their filter-
ing actions are different and both rules filtering parameters are a subset of
each other, in other words, that rule ri matches some packets that matches
rj and vice versa. Formally, this can be denoted as,
ri[action] 6= rj[action] ∧ ∀l, ri[l] ⊆ rj[l] ∧ rj[l] ⊆ ri[l], for l = 1 . . . n
Rule 1 is in correlation with Rule 3 in the firewall policy from table 2.6. The
two rules with this ordering imply that all HTTP traffic that is coming from
140.192.37.20 and going to 161.120.33.40 is denied. However, if their order
is reversed, the same traffic will be accepted.
Correlation is considered an anomaly warning because the correlated rules
imply an action that is not explicitly stated by the filtering rules. In order to
resolve this conflict, Al-Shaer and Hamed [15] write that it is advisable to
point out the correlation between the rules and prompt the user to choose
the proper order that complies with the security policy requirements.
Generalisation Anomaly A rule is considered a generalisation of a
preceding rule if their filtering actions are different and if the first rule can
match all the packets that match the second rule. Formally, rj is considered
a generalisation of ri if,
ri < rj ∧ ri[action] 6= rj[action] ∧ rj[l] ⊃ ri[l], for l = 1 . . . n
Rule 2 is a generalisation of rule 1 in the firewall policy presented in
table 2.6. The rules imply that all HTTP traffic that is coming from
the address 140.192.37.* will be accepted, except the traffic coming from
140.192.37.20.
Generalisation is often used to exclude a specific part of the traffic from a
general filtering action and is considered only an anomaly warning because
the specific rule makes an exception of the general rule. This might cause
accepted traffic to be blocked or denied traffic to be permitted, Al-Shaer
and Hamed [15] advise that it is important to highlight its action to the
administrator for confirmation.
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Redundancy Anomaly A rule is considered redundant if a preceding
rule matches all the same packets and has the same filtering action as the
rule such that removing it would not change the integrity of the firewall
policy. Formally, given two rules, ri and rj, then the rule, rj, is considered
redundant if,
ri < rj ∧ ri[action] = rj[action] ∧ ∀l, ri[l] = rj[l], for l = 1 . . . n
In the firewall policy given in table 2.6, rule 7 is redundant to rule 6, and
rule 9 is redundant to rule 10. Redundancy is considered an error in the
firewall policy because a redundant rule adds to the size of the filtering
rule list, thus increasing the search time and space requirements of the
packet filtering process. In order to avoid redundant rules, Al-Shaer and
Hamed [15] advise that a superset rule following a subset rule should have
an opposite filtering action.
In some cases redundancy might be preferred to ensure that a desired
action is performed on specific traffic, but in general it is considered
an anomaly. It is important to discover redundant rules so that the
administrator can decide whether to keep these rules, modify their filtering
actions, or remove them from the policy.
Irrelevance Anomaly A rule is considered irrelevant if the rule does not
match any traffic that can potentially flow through this firewall, that is,
when both the source address and the destination address fields of the rule
do not match any domain reachable through this firewall. Thus, resulting
in the rule having no effect on the filtering outcome of this firewall.
Rule 11 in the firewall policy described in table 2.6, is irrelevant because
the traffic that goes between the source (140.192.38.*) and the destination
(161.120.35.*) do not pass through this firewall. According to Al-Shaer
and Hamed [15], irrelevance is considered an anomaly because it adds
unnecessary overhead to the filtering process as it is well understood that
keeping the filtering rule table as small as possible helps in improving the
overall firewall performance. As such, discovering irrelevant rules is an
important function for the network security administrator.
2.3 Taxonomy of Firewall Management Techniques
In the paper ‘Traffic-aware dynamic firewall policy management: tech-
niques and applications’ [2], Qi Duan and E. Al-Shaer created a tree for
classifying firewall policy management techniques in which two top level
classifications techniques were defined, namely Matching Optimisation
and Early Rejection Optimisation.
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2.3.1 Early Rejection Optimisation
Figure 2.2 outlines the branch detailing the Early rejection optimisation
techniques. Such techniques create a minimum set of policy preamble rules
(constraints) that can potentially filter out the maximum amount of denied
traffic.
RelaxedStrict
Blacklist blockingOnline early rejection
Early rejection optimization
LCP-based blacklist blocking
BDD-based relaxed policyField value cover-based early 
rejection
Figure 2.2: Firewall policy management classification tree: Early Rejection
Optimisation branch.
According to Duan and Al-Shaer, early rejection optimisation can be
classified as either online early rejection or blacklist blocking [2]. Online
early rejection techniques differentiate between the strict Field Value Cover
Early Rejection policy and the relaxed Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) based
relaxed policy. Blacklist blocking techniques include the Longest Common
Prefix (LCP) based blacklist blocking [2].
Online Early Rejection
As stated above, there are two main policies within online early rejection,
this section describes them.
Field Value Cover-Based Early Rejection In this technique, an early
filtering module is deployed as a layer before the normal firewall policy
filtering. The early filtering module attempts to filter out as many rejected
packets as possible with the lowest overhead. This reason for this is because
dropped packets might traverse a long decision path of rule matching
before they are finally rejected by the default deny rule. Such traversal
can cause significant overhead proportional to the number of rules in the
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policy. The packets on which the early filtering module has made a decision
on, either denied or accepted, are not passed on to the original filtering
module. If the early filtering module cannot reach a decision based on its
approximation of the policy however, the packets are sent to the original
filtering algorithm.
The early rejection rules can be created as a combination of the common
field values that cover all rules in the policy. Duan and Al-Shaer state that
these rules are more practical to find because the number of unique field
values are usually few relative to the policy size. Thus, it is desirable to
search the firewall security policy for a combination of common field values
such that every rule contains at least one of these values. The authors state
that this problem can be modelled as a set cover problem. Using a set
cover approximation algorithm to can be used to generate a combination
of common field values to be used as early rejection rules.
However, finding the correct rules to use in order to achieve an optimal
rejection solution is not know in advance. The authors, Duan and
Al-Shaer, suggest a suite of three algorithms to address this problem.
These algorithms are the startup phase algorithm, the dynamic rule selection
algorithm, and the early rejection algorithm. In the startup phase algorithm,
the candidate rejection rules list is built from different solutions from the
set cover problem. The dynamic rule selection algorithm is responsible
for the periodic addition and removal of rules according to each rules
performance. The early rejection algorithm calculates the location of early
rejection relative to normal packet filtering and defines the per-packet
operation of filtering. Duan and Al-Shaer state that the limitation of this
technique is that it is not suitable for policies with a large number of
rules.
BDD-Based Relaxed Policy The fundamental concept of this technique is
to create an approximate policy based on the current policy. This technique
then evaluates every packet against the new approximate policy, and
decides to either accept or reject the packet. The original policy is deployed
as normal, but is not executed unless the early filtering module fails to
reach a decision and has to forward the packet to the original policy.
In order to create the new approximate policy, Duan and Al-Shaer state
that Efficient Boolean expressionss can be used. Thus, in the actual
implementation, boolean expressions are used to construct the Binary
Decision Diagrams. Each Boolean expression represents the different
packets that can match a specific rule, and the variables used for this
expression correspond to the bits of individual packet header fields (see
section 2.1.1 for valid packet header fields). BDDs can facilitate the
matching by representing the expression in the form of a tree, where each
variable is checked only once. Because a BDD tree is a type of binary search
tree, the decision can be quickly made for a large portion of the packet
space.
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When a packet arrives, the fields in the packet header are extracted and
sorted according to their order in the expression tree, so that they can be
used sequentially to traverse the tree. The tree traversal itself is comprised
of a set of instructions similar in nature to that of a standard binary search
tree. Simply traversing either to the right node or left node depending on
the variable at the current node; if true to the left and if false to the right.
This is repeated until a node is reached with a final value or the maximum
depth allowed in the tree is reached.
According to Duan and Al-Shaer the whole system is dynamic and traffic
aware, and can be tuned by the policy structure and previous performance
measures. The limitation of this technique is that the overhead to build the
BDD is usually significant.
Blacklist Blocking
In Blacklist blocking the fundamental concept is that of blocking specific
addresses or ranges of addresses. Longest Common Prefix Based Blacklist
Blocking is one such technique.
LCP-Based Blacklist Blocking This technique uses filter selection in
order to block addresses. A filter is a set of simple access control rules
that specifies which addresses and prefixes should be blocked. The goal
of filter selection is to build filtering rules that can minimise the impact of
malicious sources in the network using the available network resources.
The technique considers different filtering problems based on different
attack scenarios, operators’ policies and constraints. According to Duan
and Al-Shaer, each filtering problem can be modelled as an optimisation
problem.
The data structure used to represent the problems is an LCP tree. The LCP
tree is a type of binary tree where the leaves of the tree are the malicious IP
addresses, and all the other nodes represent the longest common prefixes
between any pair of IPs in the tree.
The authors state that the limitation of this technique is that all the
malicious IP addresses must be known before the computation of the
optimal solution. To defend against attackers who can move quickly
among multiple source IPs, one must recompute the optimal solutions
frequently. This suggests that this technique may not be efficient enough
for a firewall [2].
2.3.2 Matching Optimisation
Figure 2.3 outlines the Matching optimisation branch of the classification
tree by Duan and Al-Shaer [2]. This branch is also the focus of this
thesis.
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Matching optimisation algorithms try to reduce the matching time of
normal network traffic, in other words, the objective is to reduce the
number of rules to be inspected in the average case. According to Duan and
Al-Shaer there are two types of matching optimisation techniques: static
and adaptive [2].
Rule-based optimization
Algorithm based static 
Adaptive traffic-awareStatic
Matching optimization
Field-based optimization
Dynamic rule 
ordering
Offline statistical 
based rule 
generation
Multifield alphabetic 
tree Common branch tree
Segmentlist-based 
filtering
Huffman tree based 
filtering
Figure 2.3: Firewall policy management classification tree: Matching
Optimisation branch.
Static These filtering optimisation techniques attempt to improve the
search time using various algorithmic techniques such as hardware based
solutions, specialised data structures, and heuristics. However, these static
techniques are used to improve the worst case scenario, and they do not
consider the properties of network traffic.
Adaptive traffic-aware These optimisation techniques focus on improv-
ing the efficiency of packet filtering in the average case. The techniques can
adjust the filtering policies to fit the matching frequency of firewall rules or
filtering field values. Duan and Al-Shaer differentiate between two types
of traffic aware optimisations, Rule based optimisation and Field based optim-
isation.
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Rule based optimisation
Rule based techniques include Common Branch Decision tree, Offline
Statistical-Based Rule Generation, and Dynamic Rule Ordering.
Common Branch Decision Tree Decision trees can be categorised under
three optimisation criteria: worst case, average case, and mixed case. Based
on the skewness in the internet traffic, it is suggested that the average case
time is an important metric in the packet classification settings and that
algorithms based on common branch decision trees can be used to achieve
good average case performance [2].
Furthermore experimental evaluation of real-world filters showed that
common branching trees use significantly less memory than binary
decision trees, while having comparable worst case and average case search
times [2]. Duan and Al-Shaer write that the good performance of the
common branching tree can be attributed to the presence of extensive
wildcarding with a certain structure in the rule sets.
However, the limitation of the technique is that the entire decision tree
needs to be rebuilt every time the traffic pattern changes, and it is not
appropriate for heavily overlapping rules [2].
Offline Statistical Based Rule Generation An example of an offline
statistical based rule generation technique is called Traffic-aware Firewall
Optimiser (TFO) [2]. The first step in TFO is called pre-optimisation.
This step removes all redundancies in the rule set. The second step of
TFO uses two optimisers: a ruleset-based optimiser and a traffic-based
optimiser. The ruleset-based optimiser contains the Disjoint Set Creator
(DSC) algorithm and the Disjoint Set Merger (DSM) algorithm.
The DSC algorithm converts the original rule set to a semantically
equivalent disjoint rule set, which can provide the traffic-based optimiser
with full flexibility to re-order rules based on network traffic characteristics.
The DSM algorithm merges the rules of the disjoint rule set produced
by DSC to reduce rule set size [2]. The traffic-based optimiser has four
components: hot caching, total re-ordering, default proxy, and online
adaptation.
The hot caching scheme tries to put the rules with the highest matching
hit frequency to the top of the firewall policy. The total re-ordering
scheme combines the measure of hit frequency and rule size to optimise
rule ordering. The default proxy scheme is used to optimise the firewall
performance when the default deny rule is being heavily invoked. Finally,
the online adaptation scheme builds a long-term rule hit profile to optimise
the rule set [2].
Duan and Al-Shaer state that TFO is based on the assumption that only
a small portion of rules are dependent on other rules, so it cannot handle
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policies with heavily overlapped rules. Furthermore, the rule hit profile is
built offline, which limits the adaptability of TFO.
Dynamic Rule Ordering This type of technique uses a heuristic approx-
imation algorithm for optimal dynamic firewall rule ordering based on
real-time traffic characteristics [2]. The objective of optimising the firewall
rules is to create a semantically equivalent rule order that minimises the
packet matching time in firewalls. Duan and Al-Shaer state that the ORO
problem is NP-hard, thus, a heuristic approximation algorithm that runs in
polynomial time and achieves near-optimal results for the most common
firewall policies is needed.
The implementation of the technique also requires a method to compute
filtering rule weights in order to capture the matching importance of a
given rule relative to others [2]. Each rule in the filtering policy is given
a weight that reflects its priority in the packet matching process of the
firewall policy. The rule weight is calculated based on the packet matching
frequency, which determines how frequent the rule has been triggered, and
matching recency, which determines how recent the rule has been triggered
during packet matching.
The optimised rule list is constructed based on the computed rule weights
and is used for matching upcoming packets to the firewall. Due to the
dynamic state of a network connected to the internet, the filtering rules
must constantly change to adapt to the current state of the network. The
rule weights should thus, be dynamically adjusted to reflect the most recent
distribution of network traffic.
According to Duan and Al-Shaer, two types of firewall policy updates
are used: performance-based triggered updates and time-based periodic
updates. This ensures that an ordering of the policy rules that is as close as
possible to the optimal can be computed, while the overhead to compute
these updates can be minimised [2]. The limitation of the technique is that
it is not good for policies with a large number of overlapping rules.
Field based optimisation
Field value based techniques include Multi-Field Alphabetic Trees, Huffman
Tree based Filtering, and Segment List Based Filtering.
Multi-field Alphabetic Tree This type of technique calculates the field
value frequency (entropy) and uses this entropy information to build the
alphabetic search tree for adaptive packet filtering. The alphabetic search
tree stores field values in the leaves based on given weights such that the
inherent order of the stored values are preserved. This added constraint
of enforcing an order on the placement of values in the tree enables the
matching algorithm to branch left or right [2]. Duan and Al-Shaer also state
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that the constraint can eliminate the need for preprocessing of the packet
field values.
The alphabetic search tree inserts values of higher matching probability
and frequency at higher tree levels than the values with less probability.
This ensures that the average packet matching time is reduced because
there is no need to traverse the whole tree before finding a match on
average.The gain in filtering performance is proportional to the degree of
skewness in the traffic distribution over field values.
Even in the worst case scenario when the traffic distribution is uniform, this
technique cannot do worse than the worst case for binary search trees. The
limitation of this technique is that the overhead of updating the tree can be
significant [2].
Huffman Tree Based Filtering This technique uses a Huffman tree to
represent the distribution of the network traffic addresses in the firewall
policy. The Huffman tree can minimise the average number of comparisons
applied to packets arriving at the firewall. To build the Huffman tree, the
hit count can be used as weights for all addresses in the distribution. The
internal nodes of the Huffman tree contain boolean expression in order to
match packets. According to Duan and Al-Shaer, this type of technique is
good for policies with a large number of rules. The limitation is that the
Huffman tree needs to be rebuilt periodically to reflect changes in network
flows.
Segment List Based Filtering Is a technique with significantly less
maintenance cost than the Huffman tree technique. According to Duan
and Al-Shaer, one can use a policy-segment-based search list to utilise the
high imbalance in the frequency distribution of packets over the policy
segments. One can obtain a very simple yet extremely effective structure by
building a simple list of segments that is updated after each packet match.
Theoretically, the optimal order is to have the segments sorted in reverse
order of their popularity [2]. However, it is impossible to guarantee this
without prior knowledge of the exact distribution.
A heuristic algorithm can be used to minimise the average search time.
Duan and Al-Shaer state that it is good for extremely biased traffic. The
only limitation is that it only works well for a limited amount of time until
a good order of segments are obtained.
2.4 Rule Ordering Optimisation Algorithms
As touched upon in section 2.3.2 and seen in figure 2.3, matching
optimisation algorithms are one of the foci in this thesis, thus, this
section describes relevant rule order optimisation algorithms based on
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matching optimisation and outlines the general problem of firewall rule
re-ordering.
2.4.1 The Problem of Optimising Rule Re-Ordering
The task of optimising a firewall is comparable to that of the Traveling
Salesman Problem (TSP) [17] with precedence constraints [18]. In, ‘On
the history of combinatorial optimization (till 1960)’ [19] by Alexander
Schrijver, the standard TSP is defined as the task of finding the shortest
route while traversing each city exactly once, given N cities and their
intermediate distances. However, when adding constraints to the problem
it becomes more complex.
In the paper ‘The time-dependent traveling salesman problem and single
machine scheduling problems with sequence dependent setup times’ [18],
the authors, Louis-Philippe Bigras, Michel Gamache and Gilles Savard,
examine a variant of TSP with precedence constraints. This variant is
know as Time-Dependent Traveling Salesman Problem (TDTSP), in which
transition costs between two cities now depends on the time of the
visit.
This means that certain cities can only be visited at a given time, thus,
trying to find an optimal path with such a constraint means that some
cities must be visited before others. In other words, there are dependency
relationships between the cites.
This is exactly the problem of finding the optimal rule ordering in a firewall
policy with dependency relationships, because finding the optimal rule
ordering in a firewall entails creating a rule ordering such that some rules
must be "visited" or compared against before other rules, until a match is
found.
Finally, the authors, Bigras, Gamache and Savard, state that TDTSP is
considered to be a single machine job scheduling problem [18] and because
such a scheduling problem is considered to be NP-hard [20], it follows that
the optimisation problem for firewall rules is also NP-hard, thus, lest one
does an exhaustive search — which is not a scalable solution — one can
only find a sub-optimal solution to the problem using a heuristics based
algorithm.
2.4.2 A Simple Rule Sorting Algorithm
In the paper ‘Optimization of network firewall policies using ordered sets
and directed acyclical graphs’ [4], the author Errin W Fulp, designed a
simple heuristic algorithm for optimising a firewalls rule ordering as seen
in algorithm 2.1.
The algorithm is similar to the bubble sort algorithm in that it compares
neighbours and if possible it will swap them. Fulp states that in order
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Algorithm 2.1: A simple rule ordering algorithm
Data: A list of firewall rules
Result: A new and improved ordering of firewall rules
1 done = False
2 while !done do
3 done = True
4 for (i = 1; i < n; i++) do
5 if (pi < pi+1 AND ri ∩ ri+1 = ∅) then
6 interchange rules and probabilities
7 done = False
to preserve the rule precedence relationships, the algorithm uses rule
probabilities and rule intersection as the swapping criteria.
For example, suppose there are two rules, rule1 and rule2. Rule1 has a
lower probability than rule 2 and the rules don’t intersect, this means that
the rules are not dependant on each other and are thus swappable. The
algorithm will continue until there are no more swappable rules.
However, the problem with this algorithm is that one rule can prevent
another from being re-ordered [4], thus, the algorithm is unable to re-order
groups of rules. The following is an example of this problem; suppose
there are three rules. Rule1, Rule2, and Rule3. Rule 1 and Rule 3 have a
dependency relationship. The rules have the following probabilities,
Rule Prob.
Rule1 0.1
Rule2 0.5
Rule3 0.4
Table 2.7: Small rule example with probabilities
Ideally, the rule with the highest matching probability would appear at the
beginning of the rules list in order to reduce the amount of packet matches.
Thus, in order to preserve the dependency relationships, the optimal rule
order is Rule1, Rule3, Rule2. However the algorithm by Fulp is not able to
achieve this rule order the following explains this.
The algorithm will first swap Rule1 with Rule2, it will then check if Rule1
can be swapped with Rule3, but because they intersect, they won’t swap.
On the second iteration of the While loop the problem is evident; because
Rule2 is better than Rule1 they won’t swap and because Rule1 and Rule3
intersect they won’t swap. Thus when the algorithm is finished, the final
order is a suboptimal solution.
However, despite its problems, this algorithm will still create a rule
ordering that is better than the original if possible.
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2.4.3 Sub-Graph Merging Algorithm
In the paper, ‘Towards Optimal Firewall Rule Ordering Utilizing Directed
Acyclical Graphs’ [12] by A. Tapdiya and E.W. Fulp, the authors present a
heuristic algorithm for optimised policy rule re-ordering that is able to re-
order a policy containing precedence relationships (or a sub-graph in the
DAG) in such a way that the policy integrity is maintained.
The algorithm requires certain data structures to work, the following gives
a short describes of the most import requirements for the algorithm. The
algorithm needs a set, G(ri), of rules containing the sub-graph rules of ri,
i.e. the dependency relationships for ri. A FIFO Queue, S, to represent
the optimal policy rule sorting; S is initially empty. A list, Q, containing
the rules to be sorted; initially this is equal to the original firewall policy,
R.
For each pass, the algorithm selects the rule with the highest average
subgraph probability from the graph of rules available during that pass.
The selected rule is then inserted in to the list of sorted rules, S, if it has
no rules dependent on it. Otherwise, the algorithm iteratively sorts the
subgraph of its dependents until it finds a rule that has no dependent rules
and inserts that rule in the list of sorted rules. The algorithm then updates
any data structures and repeats the process until all rules have been placed
in S.
2.5 Stochastic Learning Weak Estimation
In ‘Stochastic learning-based weak estimation of multinomial random
variables and its applications to pattern recognition in non-stationary
environments’ [21], the authors B John Oommen and Luis Rueda proposed
a strategy by which the parameters of a binomial/multinomial distribution
can be estimated when the underlying distribution is non-stationary — a
non-stationary distribution is a distribution that is susceptible to change
over time.
The method, Oommen and Rueda created is referred to as Stochastic
Learning Weak Estimation (SLWE), and is based on the principles of
the stochastic Learning Automata [22, 23]. The rationale for choosing a
weak estimator for non-stationary environments is that the SLWE uses a
recursive multiplication-based update form, that achieves the process of
unlearning stale data, by an order of magnitude faster than a traditional
addition-based updating scheme.
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2.6 IPtables
IPtables is program that allows a user to to interact and configure the
Linux kernels Netfilter. Netfilter is an internal framework for the Linux
kernel which is used to manage various network related functions and
operations, such as, packet filtering, Network Address Translation (NAT)
or port translation.
As mentioned in section 2.1.2, a firewall is considered to be comprehens-
ive if it is able to manage all traffic. This is usually achieved by adding a
default rule at the end of a policy. Its purpose is to drop all non-matched
traffic, however, in IPtables, this is not a single rule. In order to set a default
deny rule in IPtables, one has to set the default policy to drop all packets as
seen in Listings 2.1.
1 iptables --policy INPUT DROP
2 iptables --policy OUTPUT DROP
3 iptables --policy FORWARD DROP
Listing 2.1: "IPtables default rule/policy example"
What this entails is that all other rules defined become exceptions to this
default drop policy. In Listings 2.2 an example of a simple IPtables rule is
given.
1 iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 22 -m state --state NEW -
j ACCEPT
Listing 2.2: "Simple IPtables rule example"
The "-A INPUT" option appends this rule to the INPUT chain, this chain
contains all filtering rules for traffic bound to this host. The other two
chains are OUTPUT and FORWARD, which handle outbound traffic and
traffic destined to another host respectively. "-i eth0" specifies which
interface to map this rule to, "-p tcp" specifies which protocol to use, tcp
in this case. "–dport 22" denotes which destination port to listen on and
because this is an INPUT rule, the destination port refers to port 22 on this
machine. "-m state –state NEW" sets the state of the connection to NEW. "-j
ACCEPT" sets the rule to accept a packet that matches the fields described
above.
Finally, IPtables does not have wildcard symbol such as (*), thus, in order
to specify "any" port or addresses, one must simply omit to use the "-s/-
d/–sport/–dport" flags in the rules.
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2.7 hping3
hping3 [27] is a command-line oriented network tool written by Salvatore
Sanfilippo, it is inspired by the linux ping utility, thus, hping3 commands
follow a similar structure to that of ping. Listing 2.3 shows an example of
using hping3.
1 # send 10 TCP packets with a random source address to localhost
2 hping3 --count 10 --rand-source 127.0.0.1
Listing 2.3: "hping3 example"
The tool enables its users to primarily send custom TCP/IP packets in order
to perform security audits and testing of firewalls and networks. However,
it has many other uses as well, the linux manual page for hping3 [27]
outlines some of them:
• Test firewall rules
• Advanced port scanning
• Test net performance using different protocols, packet size, TOS (type
of service) and fragmentation
• Path MTU discovery
• · · ·
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Chapter 3
Approach
This chapter outlines how the thesis proposes to answer the question raised
in the problem statement. The approach will describe and explain the
necessary steps needed to satisfy it.
3.1 Objectives
The objectives of the thesis pertain to the question raised in the problem
statement: How can we optimise the order of the firewall rules in order
to cope with network traffic statistics? And encompass the following
necessary steps that will be described in this chapter,
1. Describing the algorithm for rule re-ordering
2. Describing the algorithm for network traffic awareness
3. Combining the two algorithms in order to create a dynamically
optimised traffic-aware firewall
4. Outlining the experiments for the optimisation algorithms
5. Defining the expected results of each experiments
3.2 Finding the Average Matching Time of a Firewall
Policy
In the paper, ‘An argument for simple embedded ACL optimisation’ [28],
the authors Vic Grout, John Davies and John McGinn define a metric
describing the average matching time of an Access Control List. This metric
can be applied to a firewall precisely because a firewall policy is comprised
of ACL rules with dependency relationships. The following describes how
the metric is calculated.
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Let λi represent the matching probability of a rule ri in R, then the average
matching time of the rule can be denoted as,
ri ∗ λi
In other words to find the average matching time, simply multiply the rule,
ri’s probability with its current position in the firewall. Extending the above
to the firewall, R, then the average matching time of the firewall R can be
denoted as,
N
∑
i=1
ri ∗ λi, for N > 1
Thus, the average matching time is defined as the amount of rules a packet
must be compared against before a match is found. For example, given
an average matching time of 2.6 for the policy R this would mean that on
average, 2.6 packets will be compared against the rules, ri, in R before a
match is found.
From the above it becomes apparent that to optimise a firewall, the average
matching time of the firewall must be low. This can be achieved by
ensuring that the rules with high probabilities are at the top of the firewall,
because multiplying a large probability number with a low position
number will give a smaller number and consequently a lower overall
average matching time for the firewall policy.
3.3 The Algorithms
The intent of the problem statement is not to create a rule ordering
algorithm alone, but rather, to explore the problem of optimising a firewalls
performance in a dynamic network. This means that for the firewall to
have optimised performance at all times, there needs to be a connection
between when to re-order the rules as the network traffic begins to favour
other rules in the policy.
Thus, two algorithms are needed, one for rule re-ordering and one for
updating rule probabilities as the network traffic fluctuates, and finally a
program is needed in order to connect the two algorithms into an optimised
adaptive firewall.
The rule ordering algorithm should to be able to sort a firewalls rule order
based on each rules matching probability, dependency relationships, and
firewall position. This will ensure that the average packet matching time is
reduced. In order to satisfy these criteria, the algorithm will need to have
access to the current firewall security policy and knowledge of each rules
dependency relationships and matching probabilities.
The traffic aware algorithm should be able to update a rules matching
probability dynamically as the network traffic state changes. This means
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that the algorithm will need to have access to the currently applied
firewall security policy and the current amount of packet matches for each
rule.
Finally, the algorithms must be combined such that they can communicate
with each other.The traffic aware algorithm needs to be able to update the
probability of a rule and this update must be reflected in the rules used by
the rule re-ordering algorithm. Otherwise, the rule re-ordering will never
be able to find the optimal rule ordering of a firewall when the network
traffic state changes.
3.4 The Experiments
This section describes how the experiments will be conducted. The
experiments will be divided into two categories, Static Experiments and
Dynamic Experiments. Static experiments will exclusively test the rule
ordering algorithm while the dynamic experiments will test both the rule
ordering and weak estimator algorithms.
3.4.1 Environment
The experiments will be conducted on virtual machine instances created
on the Alto Cloud, cloud service at the Oslo and Akershus University College
of Applied Sciences. All machines will run on a ubuntu 14.14 server image
provided in the cloud.
In order to test the algorithms and the resulting firewalls, two machines
are needed. Machine1 (M1) will run the firewall and the optimisation
algorithms. Machine2 (M2) will generate network traffic using a traffic
generating script. However, because the testing firewalls contain rules with
random source and destination IP addresses the traffic generating script
can not send the traffic through the internet because it would be lost and
never reach the firewall at M1. The reason being that there are no hosts in
the environment with those IP address.
Thus, in order to solve this problem, a direct connection between M1 and
M2 is needed. This connection will be created by changing M2s default
gateway to the IP of M1 so that all traffic from M2 gets routed through
M1. This ensures that the spoofed IPs in the network traffic generated by
the traffic generating script running on M2 will reach the firewall at M1.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the proposed set up.
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Figure 3.1: Proposed firewall testing environment
The following commands will be used to implement the proposed environ-
ment. The first step is to remove the original default gateway so that a new
gateway IP can be added instead.
1 # @Machine2
2 sudo route del gw <existing gateway>
3 sudo route add gw <Machine1 IP>
Listing 3.1: "Changing default route example"
The second step is to enable IPv4 forwarding on the machine running the
firewall.
1 # @Machine1
2 # Turn on IPv4 forwarding so that no packets are dropped
3 echo "1" | sudo tee /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
Listing 3.2: "Enabling IP forwarding"
Finally, the below commands will be used to verify that the setup
works
1 # Use tcpdump to verify connection between M1 and M2:
2 sudo tcpdump not port 22 -nnvvS
3
4 #Use IPtables to manually check the rules
5 sudo iptables -xnvL FORWARD
Listing 3.3: "Checking the setup"
Once the above has be set up, all traffic from M2 should go through M1 and
consequently the firewall, before moving on to the internet.
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3.4.2 Firewall Technology
The firewall technology used is the IPtables framework (see section 2.6),
thus, the program and scripts will use IPtables commands to interact with
the firewall. In order to ensure unique identifiers for each rule; each rule
will be written with the commenting option in IPtables. An example of us-
ing the comment module is given in Listings 3.4.
1 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.0.0.0/8 --dport 90 -m
state --state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "A"
2
3 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.1.1.0/24 --dport 90:94 -
m state --state NEW -j DROP -m comment --comment "B"
Listing 3.4: "Simple IPtables rules example using the comment module"
In order to test a diverse firewall with both dependent and non-dependent
rules, none of the rules are bound for M1, thus, all the rules will be
appended to the FORWARD chain.
Naturally, some of the rules are not part of the actual testing, such as the
ssh rules, they are there in order to have ssh access to the testing machines
in the Alto Cloud.
Finally, each time a new firewall is applied using IPtables rules the rules
statistics are reset, essentially, this means that the number of packet
matches for a given rule are reset to zero.
3.4.3 Generating Traffic
The traffic generator will be written in python and use the subprocess
module to control the hping3 program in order to generate the desired
network traffic. The program will generate traffic according to a zipf
distribution; for each hping3 command generating traffic to test a firewall
rule, it will give them a zipf probability that will determine the hping3
commands chance of being chosen to send data packets to the firewall.
The program will use a roulette wheel function in order to decide which
command to choose based on each commands zipf probability.
3.4.4 Static Experiment 1: Intra-rule re-ordering
The intention of this experiment is to provide proof that the algorithm
for optimising the rule ordering is able to reorder the rules such that the
rules with the highest probability are at the top of the firewall while still
maintaining the integrity of the policy. This experiment specifically tests
rule re-ordering within an intra-dependant group of firewall rules.
The experiment will use a small policy of eight rules as described in table
3.1. The rules A - D and E - H are intra-dependent but not inter-dependent.
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This means that there are only dependency relationships between the rules
group A - D and E - H, but no relationships between the groups themselvs.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the relationships in table 3.1 using a DAG.
Source Destination
No. Unique Name Proto. IP PORT IP PORT Action Prob.
1 A UDP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.1147
2 B UDP 190.1.1.* * * 90-94 deny 0.0812
3 C UDP 190.1.2.* * * * deny 0.4286
4 D UDP 190.1.1.2 * * 94 accept 0.1866
5 E TCP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.0621
6 F TCP 190.1.1.* * * 88 deny 0.0499
7 G TCP 190.1.1.2 * * 88-94 deny 0.0415
8 H TCP 190.1.2.* * * * accept 0.0353
Table 3.1: A small firewall policy
A
E
B
F
H
D
C
DR
G
Figure 3.2: DAG of the small firewall policy. DR: Default Rule
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From table 3.1 its apparent that this is neither an optimal or sub-optimal
rule ordering. The rules C and D have a higher probability than the rules A
and B, thus, C and D should be placed higher up in firewall as long as the
integrity is maintained. Furthermore this configuration gives the firewall
an average matching time of 3.4921.
Expected Results
The expected results from this experiment are as follows,
1. Rule C will be placed higher up than rule B, but below rule A.
2. Rule D, despite having higher probability than rule B, will not
be placed higher up in the firewall because of the dependency
relationship between rule B and D.
3. The average matching time will decrease when the policy is re-
ordered for optimality. It should be 2.6535
3.4.5 Static Experiment 2: Inter-rule re-ordering
The intention of this experiment is to show how the rule ordering algorithm
is able to re-order rules with no dependency while still maintaining the
integrity of the policy.
The experiment will use a modified version of table 3.1 where the intra-
dependent rules, E - H, have a higher probability than that of the rules A -
D. Table 3.2 illustrates the new table.
Source Destination
No. Unique Name Proto. IP PORT IP PORT Action Prob.
1 A UDP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.0621
2 B UDP 190.1.1.* * * 90-94 deny 0.0499
3 C UDP 190.1.2.* * * * deny 0.0415
4 D UDP 190.1.1.2 * * 94 accept 0.0353
5 E TCP 190.1.* * * 90 accept 0.4286
6 F TCP 190.1.1.* * * 88 deny 0.1866
7 G TCP 190.1.1.2 * * 88-94 deny 0.1147
8 H TCP 190.1.2.* * * * accept 0.0812
Table 3.2: A small firewall policy version 2
As can be observed from table 3.2, the rules E - H should appear at the
top of the policy, while rules A - D should be at the bottom. Because the
rule groups are independent from each other the policy integrity should
be maintained. The average matching time before optimisation for this
firewall configuration is 5.1427.
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Expected Results
The expected results from this experiment are as follows,
1. The rules E - H will appear at the top of the policy in the same order,
while the rule A - D will be at the bottom in the same order.
2. The average matching time will decrease when the policy is re-
ordered for optimality. It should be 2.6535
3.4.6 Static Experiment 3: Comparing against Fulps simple
algorithm for rule re-ordering
The intention of this experiment is to do a comparison between the rule
ordering algorithm from this thesis and the simple rule ordering algorithm
by Fulp and to observe the difference in optimality in the resulting policy
re-ordering.
In this experiment the actual firewall IPtables script is not important as
its only the rule ordering algorithms that are being tested. The only
information the algorithms need are the dependency relationships between
the rules and each rules matching probability.
The experiment will use a program to generate Directed Acyclic Graphs
in order to generate generic dependency relationships and probabilities.
The experiment will use DAGs consisting of a 100 nodes (rules). The
optimality will be measured by calculating the average matching time of
the resulting optimised firewall policies after each algorithm has applied
its rule ordering on the policy.
Expected Results
The expected results from this experiment are as follows,
1. Because Fulps algorithm does not take into account dependency
relationships between multiple non-neighbouring rules nor each
rules position in the policy when deciding to swap, it should generate
policies with significantly worse average matching times than the
algorithm designed in this thesis.
3.4.7 Dynamic Experiment 1: Schedule based rule re-ordering
with dynamic traffic
The intention of this experiment it to test both the rule ordering algorithm
and the weak estimator algorithm in a dynamic network using a schedule
based re-ordering policy. The schedule policy is based on the amount of
packet matches in the firewall.
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The experiment will use two zipf distributions based on the firewall in
table 3.1. The first distribution, zipf_dist_X, will give higher probability
to the rules group E - H. The second distribution, zipf_dist_Y, will give
higher probability to the rules group A - D.
The firewall optimiser script will run the rule re-ordering (RR) algorithm
every 100 packet matches generated by the traffic generating script using
the zipf_dist_X distribution. After 1000 packets have been matched, the
traffic generator will switch the distribution to zipf_dist_Y, while the
optimiser script will continue to run RR every 100 packet matches.
For every iteration of the firewall optimiser, the average matching time of
the current firewall policy configuration will be calculated using both the
current zipf distribution probabilities and the estimated probability values
from the weak_estimator algorithm. This will produce the true average
matching time and the estimated matching time per packet matched. A
base line average matching time will also be calculated, the base line
average matching time is simply the the average matching time of the
firewall without any rule re-ordering.
Storing these values in tuples, each with the current amount of packet
matches at the time of calculation will enable the creation of a graph
showing the improvement rate of average matching time for the firewall
performance optimiser script.
The graph will consist of two axes, the X axis will represent the total
number of packet matches and the Y axis will represent the average
matching time. On this graph, the progression of the three different
matching time metrics will be plotted.
Expected Results
The expected results from this experiment are as follows,
1. The average matching times will first be very high, before steadily
decreasing and once the distribution switch occurs, the matching
times should once again sharply increase before decreasing.
2. The exception should be the base line time, which should have a
very high matching time until the traffic changes, at which point the
average matching time will decrease sharply.
3. The true average matching time should increase and decrease at a
sharper rate than the estimated average matching time.
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3.4.8 Dynamic Experiment 2: Extended Schedule based rule re-
ordering with dynamic traffic
The intention of this experiment is to see the long term effects of the
algorithm in a dynamic network using a schedule based re-ordering
policy.
This experiment is similar to the previous schedule based experiment,
however, while the general setup will be the same, the scale will be
different. The experiment will use a larger firewall policy, consisting of 17
rules as defined in Table 2.4 (disregarding the default rule). Consequently,
the zipf distributions will also be larger to match the firewall policy.
This time, the traffic generator will start to send data using an initially
optimised zipf distribution and after 10000 packets, it will change to a
different less optimised distribution.
The rule re-ordering algorithm will run every 1000 packet matches. The
average matching times will be calculated in the same manner as before
and the values will also be stored in the same manner. The resulting graph
will also be similar to the previous experiment, but with higher max values
on both axes.
Expected Results
The expected results from this experiment are as follows,
1. The average matching times will first be as low as they can be and
should continue to be relatively low and thus optimised, until the
switch occurs. Then they should increase at a fast rate, until the rule
ordering should cause a steady decreasing again.
2. Again, the base line time should have a low and generally optimised
average matching time in the beginning, before sharply increasing
once the switch occurs.
3. The true average matching time should increase and decrease at a
sharper rate than the estimated average matching time.
3.4.9 Dynamic Experiment 3: Performance triggered rule re-
ordering using a sliding window
The intention of this experiment is to observe the performance of the al-
gorithms when using a performance triggered condition. The performance
triggered condition will be based on a sliding window comprising the latest
values of the estimated average matching time of the firewall.
The experiment will consist of two parts. Both parts will use the same zipf
distribution throughout the experiment, however, the first part will shuffle
36
the zipf distribution at the traffic generator every 500 packets sent. The
second part will shuffle the distribution every 1000 packets sent.
The firewall optimiser script will run the rule re-ordering (RR) algorithm
according to a performance triggered condition. The condition will consist
of a list of the latest average matching times of the firewall. With each new
calculation of the average matching time, the value will be added to the list
and if the list is full, the oldest element will be removed in order to make
space for the latest value. This is the sliding window.
In order to decide whether to run RR or not, the optimiser script will
find the trend of the sliding window. If the trend shows that the average
matching time is increasing, then RR will be called, else, it will not. The
trend will be calculated by finding the average of all but the latest value in
the sliding window, the average is then compared against the latest value
and if the average is greater then RR will be run, otherwise it wont.
The results will enable us to create a graph, where the X axis will represent
the total number of packet matches and the Y axis will represent the
average matching time.
Expected Results
The expected results from this experiment are as follows,
1. More rule re-orderings, but the average matching time should stay
relatively low throughout the experiment.
2. The greater the sliding window size the better the performance will
be, i.e. the average matching time should be higher, the smaller the
sliding window is, and lower, the larger the sliding window size is.
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Chapter 4
Result and Analysis 1:
Implementations
This chapter contains the results of the algorithms, programs and scripts
designed and described in the approach section. It also contains proofs for
the formulas used in the rule ordering and traffic aware algorithms.
4.1 Traffic Generating Script
In order to test the new firewall configuration created by the performance
optimisation algorithms, a network traffic generating script was created as
described in the approach. The script itself is a simple wrapper for hping3
written in python and enables the user to configure hping3 commands by
passing options and flags to the wrapper script.
The script reads two files containing necessary information. The first
file contains the protocol, address, and port information needed to create
hping3 commands to test the target firewall. An example is given in List-
ings 4.1.
1 proto,src_ip,src_port,dst_ip,dst_port
2 udp,190.0.0.2,100,*,90
3 udp,190.1.1.10,50,*,92
4 udp,190.1.2.20,55,*,80
5 udp,190.1.1.2,60,*,99
6 tcp,190.1.20.3,85,*,90
7 tcp,190.1.1.8,39,*,88
8 tcp,190.1.1.2,20,*,89
9 tcp,190.1.2.90,51,*,190
Listing 4.1: "A small file containing necessary source and destination
information for the traffic generating script"
The second file contains a list of numbers from a zipf distribution and rep-
resents the probabilities for each hping3 command. An example is given in
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Listings 4.2.
1 0.42862930043528075
2 0.18657173946957867
3 0.11469285134920415
4 0.08121006644518972
5 0.062132360042377745
6 0.049922963174044155
7 0.04149198453973711
8 0.03534873454458779
Listing 4.2: "A small file containing a zipf distribution"
The files have a one to one mapping between each other. This means that
the rule created with the information at line 1 in the first file will have the
corresponding probability from line 1 in the second file. The probabilities
represents each rules likelihood of being chosen by the traffic generator
using a roulette wheel function.
Listings 4.3 shows example usage of the traffic generator. As can be seen,
the generator takes five arguments, the ’n’ flag specifies that hping3 should
only output numeric values and not attempt to look up symbolic names for
the host addresses.
The ’c’ flag specifies a count variable and represent the total amount of
packets to be sent, the ’I’ flag specifies which interface hping3 should send
its packets on, and the ’f’ and ’z’ flags represent the aforementioned im-
portant files.
1 sudo python traffic_generator.py -n -c 50 -I eth0 -f
src_dst_addr_less.csv -z zipf_dist.txt
Listing 4.3: "Running the traffic generator"
Finally, a sample output from the script is given below. The first lines
in the sample output represent the hping3 command created using the
information in the file described by Listings 4.1. The "- -faster" option in the
command tells hping3 to send packets with an interval of 1 micro second
and the "-S" option sets the SYN flag in each packet.
The reason for the latter is to speed up the packet sending process, because
the generator doesn’t need to wait for a reply and that the IPtables firewall
will register a lone SYN packet as a packet match for one rule.
Sample output from traffic_generator.py
hping3 -n -I eth0 -c 1 --faster --spoof 140.192.37.20 -s 90 -S
--rand-dest x.x.x.x -p 21
--- x.x.x.x hping statistic ---
1 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms
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4.2 Rule Ordering Algorithm
The approach section called for a firewall rule re-ordering algorithm which
is able to re-order rules based on each rules probability, dependency
relationships, and position in the firewall such that the packet matching
time is reduced. This section contains the results that satisfies the
criteria.
4.2.1 The Algorithm Design
The algorithm uses the simple rule re-ordering algorithm by Fulp (Al-
gorithm 2.1) as a base. The result is shown in Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.1: A rule re-ordering algorithm
Data: A list of firewall rules
Result: A new and improved ordering of firewall rules
1 for rx in rules do
2 ∆max = 0
3 for ry in rules do
4 ∆new = 0
5 if rx 6= ry then
6 if rx.pos < ry.pos then
7 if rx.pos < succeeding_max(ry) AND
ry.pos > preceding_min(rx) then
8 if rx.prob < ry.prob then
9 ∆new = (ry.prob− rx.prob) ∗ (ry.pos− rx.pos)
10 if ∆max < ∆new then
11 ∆max = ∆new
12 else
13 if ry.pos < succeeding_max(rx) AND
rx.pos > preceding_min(ry) then
14 if ry.prob < rx.prob then
15 ∆new = (rx.prob− ry.prob) ∗ (rx.pos− ry.pos)
16 if ∆max < ∆new then
17 ∆max = ∆new
18 if ∆max > 0 then
19 swap(rx, ry)
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In order to explain the algorithm, certain important data structures must
be described first.
• The preceding list of a rule, ri, contains all the rules that are
dependent on ri, essentially, this means that ri must appear before
the rules in the preceding list in order to maintain the policy integrity.
• The succeeding list of a rule, ri, contains all the rules that ri is
dependent on, essentially, this means that ri must appear after the
rules in the succeeding list in order to maintain the policy integrity.
The algorithm itself takes as input, a list of rules and has two main loops
that iterates through it. For every iteration of the outer loop, the inner loop
will traverse the whole list. The reason for this is that the algorithm will
compare the current element in the outer loop, rx, with the current element,
ry, in the inner loop.
The algorithm will then try to find a swapping window between rx and
ry. A swapping window is defined as an interval of positions in a firewall
in which the two comparing rules can be swapped to without breaking the
integrity of the firewall policy. The window is found by looking at the two
comparing rule’s succeeding and preceding lists.
By finding the rule with the highest position in the firewall in the preceding
list for rx and the rule with the lowest position in the firewall in the
succeeding list of ry an interval of positions can be found. Once an interval
has been found, the algorithm will check if the window is a valid swapping
window for the current rules being compared.
In order to check the validity of the swapping window, the algorithm will
check if the current position of rx is less than the lowest position in the
succeeding list of ry and if the position of ry is grater than the highest
position in the preceding list of rx, if the expression is evaluated to True
then the swapping window is considered valid.
However, the above is only valid if rx has a higher position in the firewall
than ry. In the case where ry has a higher position in the firewall than rx
(as seen in line 12 and 13 in Algorithm 4.1) there is a slight difference in
the swapping criteria. In this case the rx and ry values in the if expression
switch places. The swapping mechanic is illustrate in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: How the algorithm re-order rules
Once the algorithm has found a valid swapping window and thus knows
that rx and ry can be swapped without breaking the policy integrity, it
will do a simple comparison of the rule’s matching probability in order to
decide whether they should swap or not. However, if the algorithm finds
that they should be swapped, then the algorithm won’t properly swap
them yet, instead the algorithm will find a delta value, ∆new.
The value is created using the matching probability and position number of
the rules being compared against and simply gives the estimated average
matching time before and after swapping rx and ry, and cn be said to
represents the swapping rank of ry. The higher the swapping rank, the
more optimal the swap is considered. Consequently, the algorithm will
then perform a test to check whether this ∆new value is grater than the
current ∆max value. If it is then ∆max is set to this rules ∆new value and
then this rule is now the optimal swapping option.
When the inner loop has finished its traversal, a check is performed in order
to find if rx should be swapped with a rule or not. If it should be swapped,
then the rule with highest delta value, δmax, is chosen as the optimal rule
to swap with. Finally, the outer loop will complete the iteration and move
on to the next rule at which point the process above is repeated for that
rule.
In essence, what this heuristic algorithm tries to achieve, is to get as many
rules with a high matching probability as close to the top of the firewall as
possible.
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4.2.2 The implementation
The actual implementation of the algorithm requires two files to be read
by the program which is written in Python. The first file contains the
dependency relationships and the initial packet matching probabilities of
each rule in the firewall. The second file is an IPtables script containing the
actual firewall rules.
The algorithm assume that the IPtables file is consistent, this means that
there are no shadowing anomalies in the policy and that the policy in gen-
eral is a valid configuration without any breaks in the integrity. Examples
of both files are given in Listings 4.4 and Listings 4.5.
1 name,probability,precedence_relationships
2 A,0.125,B,C
3 B,0.125,D
4 C,0.125,
5 D,0.125,
6 E,0.125,G,H
7 F,0.125,G
8 G,0.125,
9 H,0.125,
Listing 4.4: "A small dependency file example"
1 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.0.0.0/8 --dport 90 -m
state --state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "A"
2 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.1.1.0/24 --dport 90:94 -
m state --state NEW -j DROP -m comment --comment "B"
3 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.1.2.0/24 -m state --
state NEW -j DROP -m comment --comment "C"
4 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.1.1.2 --dport 99 -m
state --state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "D"
Listing 4.5: "A small sample of an IPtables firewall script"
Each rule in the firewall is stored as an object containing the necessary
information for the rule ordering algorithm, Listings 4.6 shows the rule
class. Initially, the program reads the dependency file and stores the
relevant information from the file into objects. The position attribute in
the object is set based on the order in which each rule is read by the
program.
Furthermore, each rule object is then stored in a dictionary data structure
using the the unique name attribute as the key. Because a dictionary in
python is essentially a hash-map, this ensures fast access time to the rules
object by simply using the unique name to look up a rule.
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1 class Rule:
2 def __init__(self, name, rule, prob, pos, preceding, succeeding):
3 self.name = name
4 self.rule = rule
5 self.prob = prob
6 self.pos = pos
7 self.preceding = preceding
8 self.succeeding = succeeding
Listing 4.6: "The Rule Class"
However, not all information is attainable from the dependency file, more
specifically, the rule and succeeding attributes can not be taken from
the dependency file.
The rule attribute contains the actual IPtables command that enables the
rule. The attribute is set when the firewall script is read, and in order to
match the correct IPtables rule with the existing rules object, the program
contains a function which is able to use a regular expression in order to ob-
tain the unique identifier from the comment part of each rule. The function
in question is given in Listings 4.7.
1 def get_id(rule):
2 pattern = "--comment \"([\w+])\""
3 regexp_obj = re.search(pattern, rule)
4 if regexp_obj:
5 return regexp_obj.group(1)
Listing 4.7: "A function that gets the unique identifier of a rule"
The succeeding and preceding attributes are the same as defined
above, namely, lists containing rules that must appear before this rule and
rules that must appear after this rule respectively. While the preceding
attribute was set during the initial reading of the dependency file, the
succeeding attribute is set at a later point. The rule ordering program
contains a function which is able to set each rule’s succeeding list, the
function is given in Listings 4.8.
1 def set_succeeding(rules):
2 for rule in rules:
3 rule_name = rules[rule].name
4 if rules[rule].preceding:
5 for r in rules[rule].preceding:
6 rules[r].succeeding.append(rule_name)
Listing 4.8: "A function that sets each rules succeeding list"
The function will take a rule, ri and check it against every other rules
preceding list, if a match is found in one rules preceding list, then that rule
is put in the ris succeeding list.
Programatically, the rule ordering algorithm pseudocode, given in Al-
gorithm 4.1, has been translated into Listings 4.9.
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1 def swapping(rules):
2 for rx in rules:
3 delta_max = 0
4 delta_max_rule = None
5 for ry in rules:
6 delta_new = 0
7 if rx != ry:
8 if rules[rx].pos < rules[ry].pos:
9 rx_preceding_min_pos = find_min(rules, rx,
rules[rx].preceding)
10 ry_succeeding_max_pos = find_max(rules, ry,
rules[ry].succeeding)
11 if rules[rx].pos > ry_succeeding_max_pos and rules[ry].pos
< rx_preceding_min_pos:
12 if rules[rx].prob < rules[ry].prob:
13 delta_new = (rules[ry].prob - rules[rx].prob) *
(rules[ry].pos - rules[rx].pos)
14 if delta_max < delta_new:
15 delta_max = delta_new
16 delta_max_rule = ry
17 else:
18 ry_preceding_min_pos = find_min(rules, ry,
rules[ry].preceding)
19 rx_succeeding_max_pos = find_max(rules, rx,
rules[rx].succeeding)
20 if rules[ry].pos > rx_succeeding_max_pos and rules[rx].pos
< ry_preceding_min_pos:
21 if rules[ry].prob < rules[rx].prob:
22 delta_new = (rules[rx].prob - rules[ry].prob) *
(rules[rx].pos - rules[ry].pos)
23 if delta_max < delta_new:
24 delta_max = delta_new
25 delta_max_rule = ry
26 if delta_max > 0:
27 swap(rules, rx, delta_max_rule)
28 return delta_max
Listing 4.9: "The rule re-ordering algorithm implementation"
The rule re-ordering function, called swapping here, takes as input, a
dictionary of rule objects. The function has two main loops and for every
pass of the outer loop, the inner loop traverses the entire rules dictionary.
The reason for this is that the algorithm will compare a rule, rx from the
outer loop with every rule, ry, from the inner loop.
Furthermore for each iteration of the outer loop a delta_max variable and
a delta_max_rule variable are initialised to Zero and None respectively.
And for every iteration of the inner loop, a variable, delta_new is
initialised to Zero.
The purpose of these variables are to calculate each rules swapping rank
and to find the rule with the highest swapping rank. That rule is then the
most optimal rule to perform a swap with. delta_max_rule is simply a
variable that stores the current optimal swapping rule corresponding to the
current delta_max value.
Once the above mentioned variables are initialised, the function will try
to find the swapping window by using the functions find_min and
find_max and storing their return values in variables. The function
find_min will try to find the rule with the lowest position number and
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thus higher up in the firewall from the list of rules given as input. It will
then return the position number. If the input list is empty, then the function
will return the amount of rules in the rules list incremented by 1, as the
position number.
The function find_max will try to find the rule with the highest position
number and thus lower down in the firewall from the list of rules given as
input. It will return the position number of the rule it found; if the input
list is empty, then the function will return -1. The code for both functions is
given in Listings 4.10.
1 def find_max(rules, rule, lst):
2 if lst == []:
3 return -1
4 max_pos = 0
5 for r in lst:
6 r_pos = rules[r].pos
7 if max_pos < r_pos:
8 max_pos = r_pos
9 return max_pos
10
11 def find_min(rules, rule, lst):
12 if lst == []:
13 return len(rules) + 1
14 min_pos = len(rules) + 1
15 for r in lst:
16 r_pos = rules[r].pos
17 if min_pos > r_pos:
18 min_pos = r_pos
19 return min_pos
Listing 4.10: "The find_min and find_max functions"
When the swapping window is found, a check to find the validity of
the window is performed. If the check evaluates to True, then a simple
comparison of the rules probability is performed in order to decide whether
to swap the rules or not. If the function decides that the rules can be
swapped, then the rules delta_new is calculated based on each rules
probability and current position. And if the delta value is greater than the
current delta_max then the delta_max value is updated along with the
delta_max_rule.
Finally, once the inner loop is finished, a check is performed in order to
see if the delta_max value is above zero, if it is then that means that
there is a swappable rule. If the check is evaluated to True, then a swap
is performed using the rule with the highest delta value. When the outer
loop has finished, the function will return the value of the delta_max
variable.
4.3 Traffic Aware Algorithm
The approach section called for a traffic aware algorithm which is able to
dynamically update a rules matching probability as the state of the network
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traffic changes in the dynamic network. This section contains the results
that satisfies the criteria.
4.3.1 The Algorithm Design
The algorithm is a modified weak estimator algorithm [21]. It is modified
such that it is able to use a batch of packet matches in order to calculate
the packet matching probabilities for a given rule. This ensures that the
algorithm does not have to constantly update for each incoming packet.
The pseudocode is given in Algorithm 4.13
Algorithm 4.2: The Weak Estimator algorithm
Data: A list of firewall rules, and a lambda value
Result: Updated probabilities for each rule in the list of rules
1 for rule in rules do
2 rule.prob = Pˆ + λ(
Mi
M
− Pˆ)
The algorithm takes as input a list of rules and a λ value. It will then
iterate through the list of rules and update each rules probability by using
the modified weak estimator algorithm. In order to update each rules
probability, the algorithm calculates it using the previous probability of the
given rule, Pˆ, the total amount of packet matches, M and the amount of
packets matches for one rule, Mi.
4.3.2 The implementation
The actual implementation of the weak estimator algorithm requires a
file containing a unique identifier and initial probability for a rule as
input, this has been solved by utilising the same dependency file given in
Listing 4.4, that the rule ordering algorithm uses. The difference in the file
reading function is simply that the weak estimator file reader only returns
a dictionary with the unique identifier as key and the initial probability as
value.
In order for the weak estimator function to get up to date packet matching
values, a function which is able to read the iptables statistics was needed.
The function is given in Listing 4.11.
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1 def read_iptables_stats():
2 process = subprocess.Popen([’iptables’, ’-xnvL’],
stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
3 out, err = process.communicate()
4 out = out.splitlines()
5 pkts_per_rule = {}
6 for line in out:
7 pkts, name = get_pkts(line)
8 if pkts and name:
9 pkts_per_rule[name] = int(pkts)
10 return pkts_per_rule
Listing 4.11: "A function that reads the IPtables in order to get the amount
of packet matches for a rule"
The function uses the subprocess module in Python in order to run an IPt-
ables command that produces statistics about the current firewall. The out-
put of the command is stored in a list, out. For every iteration of the list
out, each line (containing statistics about one rule) is given to the function
get_pkts. The get_pkts function is given in Listing 4.12 and uses a reg-
ular expression to get the packet count and unique identifier from the input
rule.
1 def get_pkts(rule):
2 pattern = "^\s*([\d]+).* /\* ([\w]+) \*/"
3 regexp_obj = re.search(pattern, rule)
4 if regexp_obj:
5 return regexp_obj.group(1), regexp_obj.group(2)
6 else:
7 return None, None
Listing 4.12: "A function that uses a regular expression to get the number
of packet matches and the unique identifier for a rule"
The return value from get_pkts is stored in a dictionary with the
identifier as a key and packet count as value. Once the iteration over out
is completed, the resulting dictionary is returned.
Programatically, the weak estimator algorithm pseudocode, given in Al-
gorithm 4.13, has been translated into Listing 4.13.
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1 def weak_estimator(rules, lmbda):
2 pkts_per_rule = read_iptables_stats()
3
4 M_old = 0
5 for v in rules.values():
6 M_tmp = v[1]
7 M_old += M_tmp
8 M_new = sum(pkts_per_rule.values())
9 M = M_new - M_old
10
11 if M > 0:
12 for rule in rules:
13 cur_prob = rules[rule][0]
14 cur_pkts = rules[rule][1]
15 upd_pkts = pkts_per_rule[rule]
16 M_i = float(upd_pkts - cur_pkts)
17 upd_prob = cur_prob + (lmbda * (M_i/M - cur_prob))
18 rules[rule] = [upd_prob, upd_pkts]
Listing 4.13: "The weak estimator algorithm implementation"
The functions starts by getting updated packet matching values for each
rule by calling the read_iptables_stats function. Using the updated
values, a variable, Mnew, is created and contains the total sum of the number
of all the updated packet matches for each rule. The function will then
calculated all the total number of packet matches up till this point and store
the value in the variable, Mold.
Moving on, the function will subtract Mold from Mnew, this will give the
total amount of packet matches since the last time this function was called,
the new value is stored in the variable M.
Finally, a check will be performed, testing whether or not there has been
any new packet matches since the last time this function was called, thus
if M is zero or less, the function will simply finish. If M is grater than zero
then the function will start to iterate over the list of rules and for each rule,
calculate and update it with its new probability.
4.4 Firewall Optimiser
The approach section called some functionality in order to combine the
rule re-ordering algorithm and the traffic aware algorithm such that they
are able to communicate between them selves. The traffic aware algorithm
must also be able to update the probability of a rule and have the same
effect reflected in the rules used by the rule re-ordering algorithm. This
section contains the results that satisfies the criteria.
4.4.1 The Implementation
In order for the algorithms to communicate between each other, each al-
gorithms necessary data structures must be initialised, the init function in
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the rule ordering program was created with this in mind, the code is given
in Listings 4.14.
1
2 def init(filename_dep, filename_fw):
3 filename = filename_dep
4 iptables_filename = filename_fw
5
6 rules = read_DAG(filename)
7 iptables_preamble, iptables_rules = read_iptables(iptables_filename)
8
9 for rule in iptables_rules:
10 rid = get_id(rule)
11 rules[rid].rule = rule # set the rules field in the relevant object
12
13 set_succeeding(rules)
14
15 return rules, iptables_preamble
Listing 4.14: "Initialising the rule ordering structures"
The function takes as input two filenames, the first is for a dependency
file containing the dependency relationships and initial packet matching
probabilities. The second file is an IPtables script containing the firewall
policy. Examples of both files are given in Listings 4.4 and Listings 4.5.
The function will then call functions for reading the two files, the first read
function will create objects out of the information in the dependency file
and store them in a dictionary called rules.
The second read function will create two lists called iptables_preamble
and iptables_rules, the former contains the preamble of the IPtables
script such as ssh rules that must always be there in order to ensure
connectivity to the machine. The latter contains the IPtables commands
for applying the actual firewall. Once the data structures are initialise, the
init function will set the rule attribute in the rule object and populate each
rule’s succeeding list.
51
In order to update a rule object based on updated probability values from
the traffic aware algorithm, the function in Listing 4.15 was created.
1 def rule_update(preamble, rules_obj, rules):
2 body = []
3 # simply overwrite the value list with an updated value list
4 for r in rules:
5 rules_obj[r].prob = rules[r][0]
6 tmp_lst = rules[r]
7 tmp_lst.pop()
8 tmp_lst.append(0)
9 rules[r] = tmp_lst
10
11 for i in range(swp_num):
12 delta_max = rule_ordering.swapping(rules_obj)
13 if delta_max <= 0:
14 break
15
16 for r in (sorted(rules_obj.values(), key=operator.attrgetter(’pos’))):
17 body.append(r.rule)
18 filename = rule_ordering.write_firewall(preamble, body)
19
20 process = subprocess.Popen([’bash’, filename], stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
21 out, err = process.communicate()
Listing 4.15: "The rule update function"
The function takes as input the IPtables script preamble, a dictionary of
rules objects, and a dictionary of rule identifiers and probabilities. Because
IPtables will reset the packet count of all rules once a firewall is re-applied,
this must also be reflected in the code. Lines 4 to 9 in Listing 4.15 reflects
this.
Once the rules dictionary is updated to reflect the changes made by
IPtables, the function will execute the rule ordering algorithm by calling
the swapping function. The swp_num variable represents the amount of
times the program will call the the rule ordering swapping function on a
ruleset. Essentially, the higher the number the more optimal the rule re-
ordering will be, and for a policy with a large amount of rules, a higher
swp_num should produce the best results.
Moving on, for each call to the rule ordering swapping function, a check
is performed on the delta_max return value. If the value is zero or
less, it means that there was no rule swapping in the last call to the
swapping function, which means that there is no reason to continue calling
the swapping function and one can instead exit the loop earlier, slightly
decreasing the time taken to re-order the policy.
When the policy has been re-ordered, the function will iterate over the
rules_obj dictionery, sorted by each rule objects position number and
append each rule objects actual rule into the body list. The list will then
contain a valid ordering of firewall rules. The function will then call a new
function for writing the firewall into a file. The function takes the IPtables
preamble and the body list as input.
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Once the new firewall configuration has been written to a file, the rule
update function will use the subprocess module to apply the newly created
firewall script.
Finally, the main function of the optimiser is given in Listing 4.16.
1 def main():
2 filename = args.filename
3 filename_fw = args.firewall
4
5 rules_obj, iptables_preamble = rule_ordering.init(filename,
filename_fw)
6 rules = read_DAG(filename)
7 initial_pkts_per_rule = read_iptables_stats()
8 lmbda = 0.2
9 for i in initial_pkts_per_rule:
10 cur_pkts = initial_pkts_per_rule[i]
11 tmp_lst = rules[i]
12 tmp_lst.pop()
13 tmp_lst.append(0)
14 rules[i] = tmp_lst
15
16 try:
17 while True:
18 weak_estimator(rules, lmbda)
19 rule_update(iptables_preamble, rules_obj, rules)
20 time.sleep(wait_time)
21 except KeyboardInterrupt:
22 print "exiting the program"
23 exit(0)
Listing 4.16: "The main function"
The main function will initially, simply initiate the necessary data struc-
tures for both the rule ordering algorithm and the traffic aware algorithm.
When the the initialisation is completed, the function will enter the main
loop.
As can be seen in Listing 4.16, the update function is called immediately
after the weak estimator function has updated its values. However, as can
be seen in the dynamic experiments described in the approach section, the
conditions for calling the rule update function can be changed to suite a
users needs.
4.5 Proofs
In this section, we present some theoretical results related to our work.
The first result concerned the optimality of the devised Generalised Weak
Estimator that we propose in this paper. The algorithm is a generalisation
of the Stochastic Learning Weak Estimator proposed by Oommen and
Rueda [21]. The main difference is that the Stochastic Learning Weak
Estimator operates in an incremental manner, i.e, updates the probability
estimates upon receiving an "individual observation". The Generalised
Stochastic Learning Weak Estimator that we propose in this thesis is able to
handle a batch of M observations.
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The second result that we prove is related to the condition that we use for
swapping two rules, namely ∆new. We will show that ∆new is simply the
difference of the average matching time before and after swapping.
4.5.1 The Generalised Weak Estimator
Specifically, let X be a multinomially distributed random variable, which
takes on the values from the set {‘1’, . . . , ‘r’}. We assume that X is governed
by the distribution S = [s1, . . . , sr]T as follows:
X = ‘i’ with the probability si, where
r
∑
i=1
si = 1.
We assume that between each discrete time instants n and n+ 1, we obtain
a batch of M concrete realisations of X.
Let {x(n, 1), x(n, 2), x(n, 3), ..., x(n, M)} denote the batch of M observations
obtained between the time instants n and n + 1.
The intention of the exercise is to estimate S, i.e., si for i = 1, . . . , r based
on the batch of observations. We achieve this by maintaining a running
estimate P(n) = [p1(n), . . . , pr(n)]T of S, where pi(n) is the estimate of si at
time ‘n’, for i = 1, . . . , r. We omit the reference to time ‘n’ in P(n) whenever
there is no confusion.
Let Mi(n) be the number of elements in the batch {x(n, 1), x(n, 2), x(n, 3), ..., x(n, M)}
for which X = ‘i’. In more formal terms mi(n) =
M
∑
k=1
I(x(n, k) = 1) where
I(.) is the indicator function. Then, the value of pi(n), 1 ≤ i ≤ r, are update
in the following way:
pi(n + 1) ← pi(n) + λ(mi(n)M − pi(n)) (4.1)
The informed reader should note that the above algorithm is just a
generalization of Oommen’s original weak estimator algorithm [21]. In
fact, it is easy to note that whenever M = 1, the above updated equation
coincides with the original algorithm devised by Oommen and Rueda
[21].
The properties of the estimator are catalogued below.
Theorem 1 Let the parameter S of the multinomial distribution be estimated by
P(n) at time ‘n’ as per equation (4.1). Then, E [P(∞)] = S.
Proof The expected value of pi(n+ 1) given the estimated probabilities at
time ‘n’, P, is:
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E [pi(n + 1)|P] = [pi(n) + λ( kM − pi(n))]
M
∑
k=0
Prob(mi(n) = k) (4.2)
= (1− λ)pi + λ
M
∑
k=0
k
M
(
M
k
)
ski (1− si)M−k (4.3)
= (1− λ)pi + λ
M
∑
k=0
k
M
M!
k!(M− k)! s
k
i (1− si)M−k (4.4)
= (1− λ)pi + λ
M
∑
k=1
(M− 1)!
(k− 1)!(M− k)! s
k
i (1− si)M−k(4.5)
= (1− λ)pi + λsi
M
∑
k=1
(
M− 1
k− 1
)
sk−1i (1− si)M−k (4.6)
= (1− λ)pi + λsi
M
∑
l=0
(
M
l
)
sli(1− si)M−l (4.7)
= (1− λ)pi + λsi (4.8)
In Equation (4.3) we apply the mulinomial distribution theorem in order
to obtain Prob(mi(n) = k). In Equation(4.7), we apply a change of the
variable k, where k− 1 = l. While in Equation(4.8), we apply the binomial
theorem.
Taking expectations a second time, we have
E[pi(n + 1)] = λsi + (1− λ)E[pi(n)] . (4.9)
As n→ ∞, both equations E [pi(n + 1)] and E [pi(n)] converge to E [pi(∞)],
and can be written:
E[pi(∞)]λ = λsi (4.10)
⇒ E[pi(∞)] = si . (4.11)
The result follows because (4.11) is valid for every component pi of P. The
following result follows directly from Oommen and Rueda [21].
Theorem 2 Thus the rate of convergence of P is fully determined by λ.
4.5.2 The Swapping Condition
Theorem 3 The difference of the average matching time before swapping and after
swapping two rules rx and ry is given by: ∆new = (ry.prob− rx.prob).(ry.pos−
rx.pos)
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Let rk.pos be the position of rule k before swapping rx and ry, and let rk.pos′
be the position of rule k after swapping rx and ry.
It is easy to note that:
• rk.pos = rk.pos′ if k 6= x and k 6= y, and that
• rx.pos′ = ry.pos
• ry.pos′ = rx.pos
∆new = The Average Before Swapping− The Average After Swapping
=
N
∑
k=1
rk.prob · rk.pos−
N
∑
k=1
rk.prob′ · rk.pos
= (rx.pos rx.prob + ry.pos · ry.prob)− (rx.pos′ · rx.prob + ry.pos′ · ry.prob)
= (rx.pos rx.prob + ry.pos · ry.prob)− (ry.pos · rx.prob + rx.pos · ry.prob)
= rx.pos(rx.prob− ry.prob) + ry.pos(ry.prob− rx.prob)
= (ry.prob− rx.prob) · (ry.pos− rx.pos)
Note that ∆new = (ry.prob − rx.prob) · (ry.pos − rx.pos) = (rx.prob −
ry.prob) · (rx.pos− ry.pos)
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Chapter 5
Result and Analysis 2:
Experiments
This chapter contains the results of the experiments as described in the
approach section.
5.1 Static Experiment 1: Intra-rule re-ordering
As described in the approach section, this experiments goal was to show
that the rule ordering algorithm is able to re-order rules while maintaining
the integrity of the firewall policy. Figure 5.1 shows the initial conditions
as outlined in the approach.
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes)
    pkts      bytes target     prot opt in     out     source               destination
       0        0 ACCEPT     all  --  *      *       0.0.0.0/0            0.0.0.0/0            state RELATED,ESTABLISHED
       0        0 ACCEPT     tcp  --  *      *       0.0.0.0/0            192.168.128.206      tcp dpt:22 state NEW
      18      504 ACCEPT     udp  --  eth0   *       190.0.0.0/8          0.0.0.0/0            udp dpt:90 state NEW /* A */
      19      532 DROP       udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            udp dpts:90:94 state NEW /* B */
      87     2436 DROP       udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.2.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            state NEW /* C */
      26      728 ACCEPT     udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.2            0.0.0.0/0            udp dpt:99 state NEW /* D */
       6      240 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.0.0.0/8          0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpt:90 state NEW /* E */
      10      400 DROP       tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpt:88 state NEW /* F */
      10      400 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpts:88:94 state NEW /* G */
       5      200 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.2.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            state NEW /* H */
Figure 5.1: The FORWARD chain of iptables containing the firewall rules
for experiment 1
Observing figure 5.2, it is apparent that the C rule has been moved above
rule B but below rule A. This is expected as there is no dependency
relationship between rule B and C, but there is one between rules A and
C which is why rule C must be placed underneath it for the policy integrity
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to be maintained. The average matching time calculates to 2.6535, which is
the same as the expected value.
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes)
    pkts      bytes target     prot opt in     out     source               destination
       0        0 ACCEPT     all  --  *      *       0.0.0.0/0            0.0.0.0/0            state RELATED,ESTABLISHED
       0        0 ACCEPT     tcp  --  *      *       0.0.0.0/0            192.168.128.206      tcp dpt:22 state NEW
       0        0 ACCEPT     udp  --  eth0   *       190.0.0.0/8          0.0.0.0/0            udp dpt:90 state NEW /* A */
       0        0 DROP       udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.2.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            state NEW /* C */
       0        0 DROP       udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            udp dpts:90:94 state NEW /* B */
       0        0 ACCEPT     udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.2            0.0.0.0/0            udp dpt:99 state NEW /* D */
       0        0 DROP       tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpt:88 state NEW /* F */
       0        0 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.0.0.0/8          0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpt:90 state NEW /* E */
       0        0 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpts:88:94 state NEW /* G */
       0        0 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.2.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            state NEW /* H */
Figure 5.2: The FORWARD chain after rule re-ordering
5.2 Static Experiment 2: Inter-rule re-ordering
This experiments intent was to prove that the rule ordering algorithm is
able to re-order non-dependent rules while maintaining the policy integrity
of the firewall. Figure 5.1 shows the initial conditions as outlined in the
approach.
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes)
    pkts      bytes target     prot opt in     out     source               destination
       0        0 ACCEPT     all  --  *      *       0.0.0.0/0            0.0.0.0/0            state RELATED,ESTABLISHED
       0        0 ACCEPT     tcp  --  *      *       0.0.0.0/0            192.168.128.206      tcp dpt:22 state NEW
      11      308 ACCEPT     udp  --  eth0   *       190.0.0.0/8          0.0.0.0/0            udp dpt:90 state NEW /* A */
       9      252 DROP       udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            udp dpts:90:94 state NEW /* B */
      11      308 DROP       udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.2.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            state NEW /* C */
       9      252 ACCEPT     udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.2            0.0.0.0/0            udp dpt:99 state NEW /* D */
      77     3080 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.0.0.0/8          0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpt:90 state NEW /* E */
      38     1520 DROP       tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpt:88 state NEW /* F */
      16      640 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpts:88:94 state NEW /* G */
      12      480 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.2.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            state NEW /* H */
Figure 5.3: The FORWARD chain of iptables containing the firewall rules
for experiment 2
The results shown in figure 5.4 were largely the same as the expected
results, the rules E - H are at the top as expected while the rules A - D
are at the bottom. The one difference from the expected results is that rule
C is above rule B rather than the expected order of A, B, C and D.
However this is still a valid result as the intent was to observe the re-
ordering of non-dependent rules, thus, the intra-rule re-ordering has no
bearing on the outcome of the experiment. The average matching time
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calculates to 2.6619, which is slightly worse than the expected value of
2.6535. The reason for this is that there were more packet matches for
rule C than there were for rule B, despite rule B having the superior
probability.
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes)
    pkts      bytes target     prot opt in     out     source               destination
       0        0 ACCEPT     all  --  *      *       0.0.0.0/0            0.0.0.0/0            state RELATED,ESTABLISHED
       0        0 ACCEPT     tcp  --  *      *       0.0.0.0/0            192.168.128.206      tcp dpt:22 state NEW
       0        0 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.0.0.0/8          0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpt:90 state NEW /* E */
       0        0 DROP       tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpt:88 state NEW /* F */
       0        0 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            tcp dpts:88:94 state NEW /* G */
       0        0 ACCEPT     tcp  --  eth0   *       190.1.2.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            state NEW /* H */
       0        0 ACCEPT     udp  --  eth0   *       190.0.0.0/8          0.0.0.0/0            udp dpt:90 state NEW /* A */
       0        0 DROP       udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.2.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            state NEW /* C */
       0        0 DROP       udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.0/24         0.0.0.0/0            udp dpts:90:94 state NEW /* B */
       0        0 ACCEPT     udp  --  eth0   *       190.1.1.2            0.0.0.0/0            udp dpt:99 state NEW /* D */
Figure 5.4: The FORWARD chain after rule re-ordering
5.3 Static Experiment 3: Comparing against Fulps
simple algorithm for rule re-ordering
As described in the approach section, this experiments goal was to compare
our rule ordering algorithm with that of Fulps rule ordering algorithm and
observe the difference in average matching time.
In the the program that created the Direct Acyclic Graphs there is a
variable that decides the percentage chance that a pair of rules will have
a dependency relationship between them. This experiment set the value
to 1% and 5%. The results of the experiments are shown in Table 5.1 and
Table 5.2 for 1% and 5% respecitvely.
Percentage Initial Our Algorithm Fulp Number of Rules
1 % 26,42 12,42 24,157 100
1 % 41,18 12,16 38,81 100
1 % 31,657 12,12 24,45 100
1 % 37,31 10,87 36,2 100
1 % 37,56 11,37 35,011 100
Table 5.1: The result from the comparison with the DAG having a 1%
chance of an edge between two nodes
Table 5.1 shows the result of five tests done using a 1% chance of edges on a
graph with a 100 nodes (or rules). Initially, we notice that Fulps algorithm
is not able to improve the average matching time by a lot. Compared to
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our algorithm which is able to significantly improve the average matching
time.
Comparing the averages of the values, we find that Fulps algorithm, with
an average of 31.7256, is able to improve the initial average matching time,
with an average of 34.8254, by 8.901%. While our algorithm, with an
average of 11.788, improved it by 66.1511% which is 62.8439% better than
Fulps algorithm.
Percentage Initial Our Algorithm Fulp Number Rules
5 % 41,98 22,87 41,33 100
5 % 30,28 21,321 29,06 100
5 % 46,371 27,701 45,52 100
5 % 33,7 21,71 33,115 100
5 % 59,12 28,06 58,36 100
Table 5.2: The result from the comparison with the DAG having a 5%
chance of an edge between two nodes
Regarding able 5.2, the results state largely the same and comparing the
averages of the values, we find that Fulps algorithm, with an average of
41.477, is able to improve the initial average matching time, with an average
of 42.2902, by 1.9229%. Ours, with an average of 25.5324, on the other hand
is able to improve it by 39.6257%, which is an 38.442% improvement over
Fulps algorithm.
However, overall, while we found our algorithm to be significantly better
than Fulps algorithm. We also noticed that the denser the firewall policy
(DAG) is, the harder it is to find an optimal ordering. This is evident
by observing that the average matching time increased significantly when
increasing the chance of an edge between to nodes, and thus making the
graph denser.
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5.4 Dynamic Experiment 1: Schedule based rule re-
ordering with dynamic traffic
The intention of this experiment was to test both the rule order and traffic
aware algorithms using a schedule based re-ordering policy in a dynamic
network. In order to do so we had to change the main loop of the firewall
performance optimiser to be able to use a schedule based policy. The code
for this is given in Listing 5.1.
1 glob_pkt_cnt_thrsh = 100
2
3 try:
4 while True:
5 weak_estimator(rules, lmbda)
6 if glob_pkt_cnt_cur >= glob_pkt_cnt_thrsh:
7 rule_update(iptables_preamble, rules_obj, rules)
8 glob_pkt_cnt_cur = 0
9
10 if glob_pkt_cnt_tot >= 1000:
11 calc_average_match_time(rules, rules_obj, rules_zipf_Y,
static_fw, log_filename)
12 else:
13 calc_average_match_time(rules, rules_obj, rules_zipf_X,
static_fw, log_filename)
14
15 time.sleep(2)
16 except KeyboardInterrupt:
17 print "exiting the program"
18 exit(0)
Listing 5.1: "Main loop for the schedule based policy"
Moving on, the resulting graphs for this experiment are given in Figure 5.5
and Figure 5.6.
The first experiment results appear to be behaving as expected. We observe
that both the True and Estimated average matching times start with high
values, indicative of a poorly optimised rule ordering, before gradually
improving their times. However, there are some fluctuates in the results
causing spikes.
These might be because of the nature of the traffic generator as it wont
guarantee that packets with high probabilities are always chosen, as the
generator uses a roulette wheel function in order to decide which rule
to test, we might end up with low probability rules being chosen at
random and thus being sent to the firewall producing the fluctuations we
observer.
When comparing the True and Estimated average matching times, we
observe that they match relatively closely, with the Estimated values being
consistently slightly below the true average matching time.
Moreover, the base line time behaves as expected, it starts with a high
average packet matching time until the switch, at which point it sharply
decreases and has a relatively optimal matching time.
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Figure 5.5: The first experiment results
The second experiment results are given in Figure 5.6.
These results produces more unexpected results as there seems to have
been more fluctuations or lack thereof. The base line time is working as
expected, however, the True and Estimated times seem to be too flat. Again
this could simply be due to bad luck with the traffic generator.
We also observe that the True and Estimated times don’t match relatively
closely anymore, the reason for this might be because of the generally low
updates to each rule as it matches a packet given by the weak estimator
function.
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Figure 5.6: The second experiment results
5.5 Dynamic Experiment 2: Extended Schedule based
rule re-ordering with dynamic traffic
This experiment is very similar to the previous experiment and the
intention was to observe the long term effects of the algorithms. Thus, we
must update the following variables in the Listing 5.1 to the one below, for
the code to be valid for this experiments:
1. glob_pkt_cnt_thrsh must be set to 1000
2. glob_pkt_cnt_tot must be set to 10000
The results of this experiment are given in the graph in Figure 5.7
As can be seen, the base line is within the expectations. It has a low average
matching time in the beginning and once the switch occurs at 10000 packet
its average matching time increases sharply and becomes very poor.
Moving on, we observe that the True average matching time is behaving
unexpectedly as it should see a sharp increase in average matching time
once the switch occurs. However, comparing the True and Estimated times
before the distribution switch, we observe that they behave very similarly.
The only difference being that the True matching time has a much higher
average matching time than the Estimator. This can be explained by the
fact that our version of the weak estimator only increases each rule by a
small value
Furthermore, we notice that the Estimated time seems to be behaving
as expected, with the exception that it has a consistently lower average
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Figure 5.7: The graph shows the result from the extended schedule based
experiment
matching time, which can be explained in the same manner as above, that
our version of the weak estimator algorithm increases and decreases the
rule matching probabilities by a small amount each time.
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5.6 Dynamic Experiment 3: Performance triggered
rule re-ordering using a sliding window
The intention of this experiment was to observe the performance of the al-
gorithms when using a performance triggered condition. In order to test
this, the code had to be adapted so that it could use such a condition. The
code is given in Listing 5.2.
1 try:
2 while True:
3 weak_estimator(rules, lmbda)
4 tmp_avg_mtch_tme = calc_average_match_time(rules, rules_obj,
log_filename)
5 length = len(avg_mtch_tme_wndw)
6 if length < max_wndw_size:
7 avg_mtch_tme_wndw.append(tmp_avg_mtch_tme)
8 else:
9 # fifo list, first in first out, we only want the lates values
10 avg_mtch_tme_wndw.pop(0)
11 avg_mtch_tme_wndw.append(tmp_avg_mtch_tme)
12
13 # return true if trend is increasing, else false
14 if length == max_wndw_size and find_trend(avg_mtch_tme_wndw):
15 rule_update(iptables_preamble, rules_obj, rules)
16
17 time.sleep(2)
18 except KeyboardInterrupt:
19 print "exiting the program"
20 exit(0)
Listing 5.2: "Main loop for the performance triggered policy"
The results of this experiments are given in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9.
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Figure 5.8: The graph for switching distribution every 500 packets sent
65
From observing the result we see that in general, the bigger the window
size, the lower the average matching time is. The reason for this is because
we have more information to find if the trend shows an overall increase
or decrease in matching time. A small window size will give a lot of false
positives resulting in too early rule ordering. We notice that in Figure 5.8,
when the window size is 10, the average matching time is consistently
higher than for window size equaling 50 and 100.
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Figure 5.9: The graph for switching distribution every 1000 packets sent
However, in the graph where the distribution was switched after 1000
packets, rather than just 500, we observe that even a window size of 10
is able get comparatively good results relative to a window sizes of 50 and
100. The reason for this is that the network traffic state will stay similar for
a longer time until the switch occurs. There are some fluctuations here, but
they can be be caused by the random nature of the traffic generator.
Overall, the results match the expected results.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Project Evaluation and Impact
In this thesis the field of firewall optimisation was evaluated in regards
to firewall rule ordering and traffic awareness. Two algorithms were
designed, implemented and combined into a proof of concept firewall
optimiser. The firewall optimiser was able to re-order rules according to
statistics taken from the network about each firewall rule.
The rule ordering algorithm is able to sort a firewall policy based on each
rules packet matching probability, dependency relationships and current
position in the firewall. This algorithm came about as a combination
of the simplicity of Fulp’s algorithm and a desire to improve upon its
weaknesses. The result was a simple but also a deep algorithm in the sense
that it considers many different metrics for rule re-ordering by reducing the
average matching time of the firewall.
The traffic aware algorithm is able to update a rules matching probability
by reading the IPtables statistics about each rule and then utilise a novel
version of the Weak Estimator algorithm which is able to use a batch of
packet matches to update a rules matching probability as opposed to the
original weak estimator which requires a one-by-one updating policy i.e it
must keep track of every packet in the system. The latter is i precisely why
the weak estimator algorithm using batch came about, due to the fact that we
could not efficiently catch a packet one by one.
6.1.1 The experiments
There were a total of six experiments in this thesis, the first two were
simple proof of concept experiments with the intention of showing that
the rule ordering algorithm was able to re-order rule such that the new rule
order was superior to the original and that the policy integrity was kept
intact.
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The third experiment was comparative a study, where the algorithm by
Fulp was compared against our rule ordering algorithm. The intention was
to show that our algorithm was able to more efficiently optimise a given
firewall policy. The results found that a comparison of our rule ordering
algorithm performed significantly better than Fulp’s algorithm, by as much
as a 68% reduction of the average matching time.
The tree last experiments were more dynamic in nature and were designed
and implemented because our rule re-ordering algorithm is slow. The
slowness is because it is based on a modified bubble sort algorithm which
is an exhaustive search. Thus, in order for it to produce optimal solutions
it must be run multiple times and the larger the policy, the more time the
algorithm must run. However, this is not feasible, especially in a real life
scenario.
In an attempt to reduce the slow and exhaustive nature of the rule
ordering algorithm, the aforementioned experiments were created. These
experiments contain the proposed solutions to the slowness problem. The
first two are schedule based rule re-oredering policy experiments.
A schedule based policy is simply a policy where you specify when an
action should be executed, in this case, the action was to call the rule update
function. The experiments set the execution policy to be after 100 packets
and a 1000 packets respectively.
The resulting graphs show that it could be a viable solution to the slowness
problem of the re-ordering algorithm, however due to consistent packet
losses, it was hard to interpret the resulting graphs. Section 6.2.1 explains
the problem.
The last experiment was a performance triggered rule re-ordering experi-
ment. A performance trigger is similar to schedule based rule re-ordering,
however, instead of using simple variables to find when to run the rule up-
date function, it will instead calculate the optimal time to call the update
function.
In the experiment, we used a sliding window to contain the latest average
matching times of the policy and tried to find the trend in the window. If
the trend was an overall increase in matching time then that means that the
current rule ordering is not optimal and must be re-ordered.
The results from this experiment reveals that this type of re-ordering
works very well. The graphs showed that the average matching time was
consistently kept at a low level. However, the problem with performance
triggering is that they could potentially become very computationally
heavy.
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6.1.2 Impact
Primarily, large organisation and institutes will benefit the most from this
thesis as they must handle large amounts of data from their workforce.
Ensuring that the firewall is optimised is especially important because of
the predictions made by the Internet of Things [1].
The paper predicts that each person will have 6.58 devices connected to the
internet on average, resulting in 50 billion devices being connected to the
internet world wide, thus, having an optimised firewall will ensure that the
firewall does not become a bottleneck in the current and future high-speed
networks.
Furthermore, with so many devices connected to the internet this means
that there will invariably be a lot of sensitive data stored on various
networks, thus, having an optimised firewall will be able to mitigate
network attacks more so than a static and un-optimised firewall.
Finally, the results of this thesis are easy to integrate with existing firewalls
such as IPtables and the Weak Estimator Batch algorithm that we found
should also be usable in every instance that the original is.
6.2 Technical Pitfalls, Limitations and Inaccuracies
During the course of writing this thesis and answering the problem
statement various limitations and inaccuracies were discovered regarding
the firewall performance optimiser.
6.2.1 An Unstable Environment
During the the experimental phase of this thesis there were several
instances were an experiment was dependent on accurate communication
between the traffic generator and the firewall optimiser. For instance,
during the the dynamic experiments regarding the schedule base rule re-
ordering policy, the test was based on calculating the average matching
time of the firewall. There were three instances of the average matching
time that the experiment wanted to compare. The first was the True average
matching time, the second was the estimate average matching time and the
last was the base line average matching time.
The latter instance was not the problem as the base line could be calculated
without outside interference, however, both the true and estimated average
matching time took the current position of a rule into account when
calculating the time. At first thought, this should not cause any significant
problems as the whole point of the firewall optimiser is to periodically re-
order the policy rules, however, the experiment was set up such that after
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X amount of packets had been sent from the traffic generator, the generator
itself would switch its zipf distribution to another ordering.
The idea was that this would force the optimiser to to do some major
rule re-ordering making the resulting graph more interesting. The
problem occurred because the true average matching time doesn’t use
the probability data from the optimiser itself when calculating its average
matching time; in order to calculate the true average matching time, the
optimiser uses the same distribution as that of the traffic generator, thus,
when the generator switches distribution after X amount of packets have
been sent, the optimiser must also do the same after a similar amount of
packets have been matched. And it is herein the problem lies.
While executing the experiment there was a lot of packet loss on the firewall
optimiser side. This packet loss causes the timing of the distribution switch
on the firewall optimiser side to be wrong. This in turn caused the true
average matching time to be out of sync with the traffic generator and the
estimated average matching time.
The reason for this packet loss could be three-fold. It could be a problem
with the traffic generator as it is unable to guarantee that all packets sent
will reach its destination. The reason for this is that it simply sends SYN
packets and doesn’t wait for reply. On the other hand the inaccuracies
and packet loss might be because of an inherent instability in the cloud
environment.
As one of the benefits of a cloud environment is that all the underlying hard
ware has been abstracted away in order to simplify the process of creating
new instance. However, because of this streamlining one doesn’t know
everything about the underlying hard ware, this means that one doesn’t
know whether multiple virtual machine instance are situated on the same
hardware or if they are spread across the hardware encompassed by the
cloud.
Thus, there might be a lot of hops between the traffic generator and the
firewall optimiser, and because the traffic generator does not guarantee the
arrival of a packet, the prospect of packet loss due to packet getting lost on
the way is something that should be taken into account.
The third possibility for the packet loss might also be that the optimiser
setup itself takes too long to re-order rules that by the time the new firewall
is applied and the program can continue monitoring the iptables statistics,
packets might not have been counted in between. One way to solve this
problem would be to make the firewall optimiser system work in parallel,
with one thread for rule ordering, one thread for weak estimator updating
and a final thread for communication between the algorithms.
Either way more testing is needed in order to find the cause of the packet
losses.
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6.2.2 Limitations of the Weak Estimator Algorithm
The Weak Estimator Batch algorithm created in this thesis is independent
of the batch size; recalling that the weak estimator algorithm will use
the following formula to calculate an updated probability for a given
rule,
pˆi + λ(
mi
M
− pˆi)
Where Mi is the amount of current packet matches for a given rule and
that M is the total amount of current packet matches for the entire firewall
policy. It is apparent that for any equal value of Mi and M the algorithm
cannot tell the difference between,
mi = 4
M = 5
⇔ mi = 40
M = 50
It should be able to understand that
40
50
are more packets than
4
5
and should
thus increase the probability for the former more than for the latter. Note
that despite the ratio
40
50
being equal to
4
5
, the magnitude of the updated
probability should not be the same because the size of the respective
batches are different.
Another limitation of the Weak Estimator Batch algorithm is that it must
be run often because each estimation update is only by a small number.
This could potentially cause unnecessary overhead. Thus it might be a
good idea to improve the estimation such that it doesn’t need to be run
as often.
6.3 Future Work
• Future work might look at existing heuristic algorithms regarding
the Asymmetric Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP with precedence
constraints) and their application for firewall rule optimisation.
The reason being that a TSP with precedence constraints is the
same problem as that of optimising a firewall with dependency
relationships rule order.
• Perform experiments using more real world policies and network
traffic data.
• Perform experiments on larger firewall policies.
• Regarding the problem discussed in section 6.2.1, revisiting the
experiments done in this thesis using a more controlled testing
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environment, where we can guarantee no packet loss between virtual
machine instances.
• Update the firewall optimiser created in this thesis to be run in
parallel, by having the rule re-ordering algorithm be one thread,
the weak estimator algorithm be another thread, and finally have a
thread that ensures communication between the two algorithms.
• A new type of firewall optimisation. Create a program able to
read the fingerprint of a network (i.e the current state of the traffic),
generate an optimised firewall based on the fingerprint and then store
them in a database. Finally, the traffic reading program will be able
to read the current traffic and apply the appropriate firewall based on
the fingerprint from the database.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The main goal of this thesis was to investigate how to optimise a firewall’s
rule ordering using network traffic statistics.
The problem statement is addressed by developing two algorithms in order
to achieve optimisation of a firewall’s rules in a dynamic network. The first
algorithm is a rule re-ordering algorithm. It is based on Fulp’s simple and
naive algorithm for optimising rule re-ordering.
Our algorithm uses more complex metrics for determining rule re-ordering
and through experiments it has been shown to reduce the average
matching time by as much as 68% more than Fulp’s.
The second algorithm is a traffic aware algorithm. It is based on the
weak estimator algorithm by Oommen and Rueda. However, it has been
modified to accommodate batch updating of rule probabilities rather than
having to rely on keeping track of every packet in the system in order to
update rule probabilities.
Although this is still only a work in progress, through various experiments,
it has been show that the firewall performance optimiser works and is able
to re-order rules by using information from the network.
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Appendices
Firewalls
1 #! /bin/bash
2
3 if [ "$(id -u)" != "0" ]; then
4 echo "This script must be run by root"
5 exit 1
6 fi
7
8 # Open everything and then flush all iptables rules
9 iptables --policy INPUT ACCEPT
10 iptables --policy OUTPUT ACCEPT
11 iptables --policy FORWARD ACCEPT
12 iptables -F
13
14 #---------------POLICY--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 iptables --policy INPUT DROP
16 iptables --policy OUTPUT DROP
17 iptables --policy FORWARD DROP
18 #-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19
20 #---------------ESTABLISHED/RELATED_TRAFFIC-----------------------------------------------------------
21 # Allow all INPUT/OUTPUT/FORWARD with the state ESTABLISHED or RELATED
22 iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
23 iptables -A OUTPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
24 iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
25 #-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
26
27 #---------------DNS_RULES-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 # Allow outgoing dns connections from gateway
29 iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp --dport 53 -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT
30 #-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
31
32 #---------------SSH_RULES-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
33 # allow incoming ssh connections to gateway from the internet and desktop
34 # from the internet
35 iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 22 -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT
36
37 # some forward ssh connections comming from the outside to Machine2
38 iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 22 -d 192.168.128.206 -m state --state
NEW -j ACCEPT
39 #-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
40
41 #---------------BEGIN_RULES---------------------------------------------------------------------------
42 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.0.0.0/8 --dport 90 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "A"
43 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.1.1.0/24 --dport 90:94 -m state
--state NEW -j DROP -m comment --comment "B"
44 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.1.2.0/24 -m state --state NEW
-j DROP -m comment --comment "C"
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45 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.1.1.2 --dport 94 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "D"
46
47 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -s 190.0.0.0/8 --dport 90 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "E"
48 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -s 190.1.1.0/255.255.255.0 --dport 88
-m state --state NEW -j DROP -m comment --comment "F"
49 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -s 190.1.1.2/24 --dport 88:94 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "G"
50 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -s 190.1.2.0/24 -m state --state NEW
-j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "H"
51
52 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -d 161.120.33.41 --dport 25 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "I"
53 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -s 140.192.37.30 --dport 21 -m state
--state NEW -j DROP -m comment --comment "J"
54 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -d 161.120.33.0/24 --dport 21 -m state
--state NEW -j DROP -m comment --comment "K"
55 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -s 140.192.37.0/24 --dport 21 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "L"
56 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -d 161.120.33.0/24 --dport 22 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "M"
57 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -s 140.192.37.0/24 --dport 80 -m state
--state NEW -j DROP -m comment --comment "N"
58 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -d 161.120.33.40 --dport 80 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "O"
59 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -d 161.120.33.43 --dport 53 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "P"
60 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -d 161.120.33.43 --dport 53 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "Q"
61 #-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
62
63 iptables -xnvL
Listing 7.1: "Original IPtables firewal file"
1 #! /bin/bash
2
3 if [ "$(id -u)" != "0" ]; then
4 echo "This script must be run by root"
5 exit 1
6 fi
7
8 # Open everything and then flush all iptables rules
9 iptables --policy INPUT ACCEPT
10 iptables --policy OUTPUT ACCEPT
11 iptables --policy FORWARD ACCEPT
12 iptables -F
13
14 #---------------POLICY--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 iptables --policy INPUT DROP
16 iptables --policy OUTPUT DROP
17 iptables --policy FORWARD DROP
18 #-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19
20 #---------------ESTABLISHED/RELATED_TRAFFIC-----------------------------------------------------------
21 # Allow all INPUT/OUTPUT/FORWARD with the state ESTABLISHED or RELATED
22 iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
23 iptables -A OUTPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
24 iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
25 #-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
26
27 #---------------DNS_RULES-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 # Allow outgoing dns connections from gateway
29 iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp --dport 53 -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT
30 #-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
31
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32 #---------------SSH_RULES-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
33 # allow incoming ssh connections to gateway from the internet and desktop
34 # from the internet
35 iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 22 -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT
36
37 # some forward ssh connections comming from the outside to Machine2
38 iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 22 -d 192.168.128.206 -m state --state
NEW -j ACCEPT
39 #-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
40
41 #---------------BEGIN_RULES---------------------------------------------------------------------------
42 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.0.0.0/8 --dport 90 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "A"
43 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.1.1.0/24 --dport 90:94 -m state
--state NEW -j DROP -m comment --comment "B"
44 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.1.2.0/24 -m state --state NEW
-j DROP -m comment --comment "C"
45 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p udp -s 190.1.1.2 --dport 99 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "D"
46
47 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -s 190.0.0.0/8 --dport 90 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "E"
48 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -s 190.1.1.0/255.255.255.0 --dport 88
-m state --state NEW -j DROP -m comment --comment "F"
49 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -s 190.1.1.2/24 --dport 88:94 -m state
--state NEW -j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "G"
50 iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p tcp -s 190.1.2.0/24 -m state --state NEW
-j ACCEPT -m comment --comment "H"
51 #-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
52
53 iptables -xnvL
Listing 7.2: "Small version of IPtables firewal file"
Firewall Script for Opening It Up Again
1 # Open everything and then flush all iptables rules
2 iptables --policy INPUT ACCEPT
3 iptables --policy OUTPUT ACCEPT
4 iptables --policy FORWARD ACCEPT
5 iptables -F
Listing 7.3: "Script for removing firewall"
Traffic Generator and Input Files
This is the program used to test the firewall optimisation setup.
1 #! /usr/bin/env python
2
3 import os
4 import sys
5 import argparse
6 import logging
7 import csv
8 import subprocess
9 import random
10 import pprint
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11
12 def read_zipf(filename):
13 with open(filename, ’rb’) as f:
14 lines = [line.rstrip(’\n’) for line in f]
15 return lines
16
17 def read_file(cmd, filename):
18 hping3_cmds = []
19 skip = True
20 with open(filename, ’rb’) as f:
21 for row in csv.reader(f):
22 if skip:
23 skip = False
24 continue
25
26 proto, src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port =
",".join(row).split(’,’)
27 new_cmd = cmd
28
29 if proto == "udp":
30 new_cmd += " --udp"
31
32 if src_ip == "*":
33 new_cmd += " --rand-source"
34 else:
35 new_cmd += " --spoof " + src_ip
36
37 new_cmd += " -s " + src_port
38
39 new_cmd += " -S" # set SYN FLAG
40
41 if dst_ip == "*":
42 new_cmd += " --rand-dest x.x.x.x"
43 else:
44 new_cmd += " " + dst_ip
45
46 new_cmd += " -p " + dst_port
47
48 hping3_cmds.append(new_cmd)
49 return hping3_cmds
50
51 def weighted_random_choice(choices):
52 total = sum(choices.values())
53 logging.debug(choices.values())
54 logging.debug(type(total))
55 logging.debug("total: %f" % total)
56
57 rand_val = random.uniform(0, total)
58 logging.debug("rand_val: %f" % rand_val)
59 current = 0
60 count = 0
61 for key, value in choices.items():
62 logging.debug("####################ITERATION
%d######################" % count)
63 current += value
64 logging.debug("current: %f" % current)
65 logging.debug("value: %f" % value)
66 logging.debug("key: %s" % key)
67 if current > rand_val:
68 logging.debug("The returned key: %s" % key)
69 return key
70 count += 1
71
72 def generate_zipf_distribution(N, s):
73 zipf_dist = []
74 sum_z = 0
75 for i in range(1, N + 1):
76 sum_z += 1.0/i**s
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77
78 for i in range(1, N + 1):
79 k = i
80 tmp = (1.0/k**s)/sum_z
81 zipf_dist.append(tmp)
82
83 logging.debug("the generated distribution:")
84 logging.debug(zipf_dist)
85 sum_dist = sum(zipf_dist)
86 logging.debug("the sum of the distribution is: %f" % sum_dist)
87
88 pprint.pprint(zipf_dist)
89 random.shuffle(zipf_dist)
90 pprint.pprint(zipf_dist)
91 exit(0)
92 logging.debug("distribution after shuffle:")
93 logging.debug(zipf_dist)
94 return zipf_dist
95
96 # send traffic from a random source address to a destination address
97 # -n: numeric mode, wont do a lookup for IP
98 # -V: verbose mode
99 # --flood: send packets as fast as possible without waiting for reply
100 # --udp: udp mode, default mode is tcp
101 # --spoof <hostname>: spoof source address
102 # --rand-source: random source address
103 # --rand-dest: random destination address based on user specified rules
104 # i.e: 10.0.0.x
105 # --interval [u]<number>: wait time before sending a pacet in
[micro]seconds
106 # --fast: alias for -i u10000 (10 packets/s)
107 # --faster: alias for -i u1 (faster than fast)
108 # --interface: choose an interface
109 # --count <number>: how many packets to send
110 # -D: or --debug
111 # sudo hping3 -VDn --faster --count 10 --rand-source 127.0.0.1
112 # sudo hping3 -VDn -I lo --faster --count 10 --rand-source --rand-dest
127.0.0.x
113 #cmd = "hping3 -VDn --faster --count 10 --rand-source 127.0.0.1"
114 def hping3(cmd):
115 print "\n" + cmd
116 command = cmd.split()
117 try:
118 #with open(os.devnull, ’w’) as devnull:
119 # subprocess.check_call(command, stdout=devnull) # we will get 100%
packet loss because we spoof src IPs, so replys won’t go
anywhere
120 # we will get 100% packet loss because we spoof src IPs, so replys
won’t go anywhere
121 p = subprocess.Popen(command, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
122 p.stdout.read(1)
123 p.communicate()
124 except (subprocess.CalledProcessError, KeyboardInterrupt) as e:
125 repr(e)
126
127 def main():
128 parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="A program that generates
custom network traffic using hping3",
formatter_class=argparse.RawTextHelpFormatter)
129
130 parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", help="increase output
verbosity", action="store_true")
131 parser.add_argument("-D", "--debug", help="debug for hping3",
action="store_true")
132 parser.add_argument("-n", "--numeric", help="numeric output only for
hping3, no ip lookups", action="store_true")
133 parser.add_argument("-I", "--interface", help="the interface hping3
should use", type=str, required=True)
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134 #parser.add_argument("-c", "--count", help="number of packet hping3
should send", type=str, required=False)
135 parser.add_argument("-c", "--count", help="total number of packet to
send", type=str, required=True)
136 parser.add_argument("--flood", help="tell hping3 to send pacekts as
fast as possible without waiting for replies", action="store_true")
137 parser.add_argument("-f", "--file", help="file with a list of source
and destination addresses and ports", type=str, required=True)
138 parser.add_argument("-z", "--zipf", help="file containing a zipf
distribution", type=str, required=False)
139 args = parser.parse_args()
140
141 cmd = "hping3 "
142 #count = False
143 total_count = 0
144
145 if args.verbose:
146 logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG, format=’%(asctime)s -
%(pathname)s - p%(process)s - %(levelname)s -
%(funcName)s:%(lineno)d - %(message)s’)
147 cmd += " -V"
148
149 logging.debug("Program Start.")
150
151 if args.debug:
152 cmd += " -D"
153
154 if args.numeric:
155 cmd += " -n"
156
157 if args.interface:
158 cmd += " -I " + args.interface
159
160 if args.count:
161 #cmd += " -c " + args.count
162 #count = True
163 cmd += " -c 1"
164 total_count = int(args.count)
165 #else:
166 # cmd += " -c 1"
167
168 if args.flood:
169 cmd += " --flood"
170 else:
171 cmd += " --faster"
172
173 if args.file:
174 cmd_lst = read_file(cmd, args.file) # a list of cmds in the same
order as in args.file
175
176 zipf_dist = []
177 if args.zipf:
178 zipf_dist = read_zipf(args.zipf)
179 else:
180 zipf_dist = generate_zipf_distribution(len(cmd_lst), 1.2)
181
182 choice_dict = {}
183 for i in range(len(cmd_lst)):
184 choice_dict[cmd_lst[i]] = float(zipf_dist[i])
185
186 # pprint.pprint(cmd_lst)
187 # pprint.pprint(zipf_dist)
188 # pprint.pprint(choice_dict)
189
190 logging.debug(choice_dict)
191 count = 0
192 try:
193 while total_count > 0:
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194 print "Total Count: " + str(total_count)
195 print "Count: " + str(count)
196 if count == 1000:
197 zipf_shuffle = random.shuffle(zipf_dist)
198 choice_dict = {}
199 for i in range(len(cmd_lst)):
200 choice_dict[cmd_lst[i]] = float(zipf_dist[i])
201 pprint.pprint(choice_dict)
202 cmd = weighted_random_choice(choice_dict)
203 try:
204 hping3(cmd)
205 except KeyboardInterrupt:
206 print "exiting hping3 command function"
207 total_count -= 1
208 count += 1
209 except KeyboardInterrupt:
210 print "Exiting the program"
211 exit(0)
212
213 if __name__ == ’__main__’:
214 main()
Listing 7.4: "The final traffic generator program"
1 proto,src_ip,src_port,dst_ip,dst_port
2 udp,190.0.0.2,100,*,90
3 udp,190.1.1.10,50,*,92
4 udp,190.1.2.20,55,*,80
5 udp,190.1.1.2,60,*,94
6 tcp,190.1.20.3,85,*,90
7 tcp,190.1.1.8,39,*,88
8 tcp,190.1.1.2,20,*,89
9 tcp,190.1.2.90,51,*,190
10 tcp,*,11,161.120.33.41,25
11 tcp,140.192.37.30,9,*,21
12 tcp,*,130,161.120.33.40,21
13 tcp,140.192.37.20,90,*,21
14 tcp,*,2001,161.120.33.101,22
15 tcp,140.192.37.111,2333,*,80
16 tcp,*,1,161.120.33.40,80
17 tcp,*,2,161.120.33.43,53
18 udp,*,3,161.120.33.43,53
Listing 7.5: "Original information file"
1 proto,src_ip,src_port,dst_ip,dst_port
2 udp,190.0.0.2,100,*,90
3 udp,190.1.1.10,50,*,92
4 udp,190.1.2.20,55,*,80
5 udp,190.1.1.2,60,*,99
6 tcp,190.1.20.3,85,*,90
7 tcp,190.1.1.8,39,*,88
8 tcp,190.1.1.2,20,*,89
9 tcp,190.1.2.90,51,*,190
Listing 7.6: "Small version of original file"
Rule Ordering Program and Input Files
The program takes two files as input, a dependency relationship file and a
firewall file (which are given above)
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1 #! /usr/bin/env python
2 import sys
3 import time
4 import datetime
5 import argparse
6 import logging
7 import csv
8 import re
9 import operator
10 import pprint
11
12 class Rule:
13 def __init__(self, name, rule, prob, pos, preceding, succeeding):
14 self.name = name # Unique name based on the hash of the rule
15 self.rule = rule # The actual rule
16 self.prob = prob # The matching probability for this rule
17 self.pos = pos # Position in firewall
18 self.preceding = preceding # A list of preceding rules representing
the precedence relationships
19 # between this rule and the rules in the list
20 self.succeeding = succeeding # A list of succeeding rules
representing the reverse precedence
21 # relationships between this rule and the
rules in the list
22 def get_average_matching_time_estimate(self):
23 return float(self.prob * self.pos)
24
25 def get_average_matching_time_true(self, prob):
26 return float(self.pos * prob)
27
28 def get_id(rule):
29 pattern = "--comment \"([\w+])\""
30 regexp_obj = re.search(pattern, rule)
31 if regexp_obj:
32 return regexp_obj.group(1)
33 else:
34 logging.debug("No match found, this should not happen")
35 exit(1)
36
37 def read_iptables(filename):
38 iptables_preamble = []
39 iptables_rules = []
40 begin_rules = False
41
42 with open(filename, ’r’) as f:
43 for line in f:
44 if "BEGIN_RULES" in line:
45 begin_rules = True
46
47 if line.startswith("\n") or line.startswith(’#’): # skip newlines
and comments
48 continue
49
50 if begin_rules:
51 iptables_rules.append(line.strip())
52 else:
53 iptables_preamble.append(line.strip())
54 return iptables_preamble, iptables_rules
55
56 def read_DAG(filename):
57 rules = {} # empty dictionary of rules in the DAG
58 rules_list = [] # empty list of hashed rules in the original order
59 count = 1
60 skip = True
61 with open(filename, ’rb’) as f:
62 for row in csv.reader(f):
63 if skip:
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64 skip = False
65 continue
66 name = row[0]
67 prob = float(row[1])
68 pos = count
69 if row[2]:
70 preceding = row[2:]
71 else:
72 preceding = []
73 rule = " " # place holder
74 rules[name] = Rule(name, rule, prob, pos, preceding,
succeeding=[])
75 rules_list.append(name)
76 count += 1
77 return rules, rules_list
78
79 def write_firewall(preamble, body):
80 logging.debug(preamble)
81 logging.debug(body)
82 ts = time.time()
83 st = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(ts).strftime(’%Y-%m-%d_%H:%M:%S’)
84 filename = st + "_fw.rc"
85 with open(filename, ’wb’) as f:
86 for rule in preamble:
87 f.write(rule + "\n")
88
89 f.write("\n")
90
91 for rule in body:
92 f.write(rule + "\n")
93 return filename
94
95 def set_succeeding(rules):
96 for rule in rules:
97 rule_name = rules[rule].name
98 if rules[rule].preceding:
99 for r in rules[rule].preceding:
100 rules[r].succeeding.append(rule_name)
101
102 def find_max(rules, rule, lst):
103 logging.debug("rule: %s" % rule)
104 logging.debug("lst: ")
105 logging.debug(lst)
106 if lst == []:
107 #return rules[rule].pos
108 #return len(rules) + 1
109 return -1
110 max_pos = 0
111 for r in lst:
112 r_pos = rules[r].pos
113 if max_pos < r_pos:
114 max_pos = r_pos
115 return max_pos
116
117 def find_min(rules, rule, lst):
118 logging.debug("rule: %s" % rule)
119 logging.debug("lst: ")
120 logging.debug(lst)
121 if lst == []:
122 #return rules[rule].pos
123 #return -1
124 return len(rules) + 1
125 min_pos = len(rules) + 1
126 for r in lst:
127 r_pos = rules[r].pos
128 if min_pos > r_pos:
129 min_pos = r_pos
130 return min_pos
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132 def swap(rules, rx, ry):
133 logging.debug("Swapping rule %s and %s" % (rx, ry))
134 temp_pos = rules[rx].pos
135 rules[rx].pos = rules[ry].pos
136 rules[ry].pos = temp_pos
137
138 # we just want to get the ones with highest probability as far up as
possible
139 # to find the optimal placement of all rules would not be practical in
regards to time
140 # since it would take a very long time to do an exhaustive search to find
the optimal solution
141 # we use a heuristic solution that simply tries to get as many of the
rules with higer prbability
142 # as high up as possible
143 def swapping(rules):
144 for rx in rules:
145 logging.debug("RX: %s" % rx)
146 delta_max = 0
147 delta_max_rule = None
148 for ry in rules:
149 logging.debug("RY: %s" % ry)
150 delta_new = 0
151 if rx != ry:
152 logging.debug("RX:%s != RY:%s" % (rx, ry))
153 logging.debug("RX.pos: %d, RY.pos: %d" % (rules[rx].pos,
rules[ry].pos))
154 if rules[rx].pos < rules[ry].pos: # rx is higher up in the
firewall rules list
155 logging.debug("rx.pos < ry.pos: RX is higher up than RY")
156 rx_preceding_min_pos = find_min(rules, rx,
rules[rx].preceding)
157 ry_succeeding_max_pos = find_max(rules, ry,
rules[ry].succeeding)
158 logging.debug("RX Preceding Min Pos: %d" %
rx_preceding_min_pos)
159 logging.debug("RY Succeeding Max Pos: %d" %
ry_succeeding_max_pos)
160 #if rules[rx].pos > ry_succeeding_min_pos and rules[ry].pos
< rx_preceding_max_pos:
161 if rules[rx].pos > ry_succeeding_max_pos and rules[ry].pos
< rx_preceding_min_pos:
162 if rules[rx].prob < rules[ry].prob:
163 logging.debug("rules[rx], rx=%s: " % rx)
164 logging.debug(rules[rx])
165 logging.debug("rules[ry], ry=%s: " % ry)
166 logging.debug(rules[ry])
167 delta_new = (rules[ry].prob - rules[rx].prob) *
(rules[ry].pos - rules[rx].pos)
168 logging.debug("delta_new: %d" % delta_new)
169 if delta_max < delta_new:
170 delta_max = delta_new
171 delta_max_rule = ry
172 logging.debug("delta_max(=%d) < delta_new, ry: %s"
% (delta_max, ry))
173 else:
174 logging.debug("ry has lower prob than rx")
175 else:
176 logging.debug("RX.pos is greater than
ry_succeeding_min_pos and RY.pos is less than
rx_preceding_max_pos")
177 else: # ry is higher up in the firewall rules list
178 logging.debug("ry.pos < rx.pos: RY is higher up than RX")
179 ry_preceding_min_pos = find_min(rules, ry,
rules[ry].preceding)
180 rx_succeeding_max_pos = find_max(rules, rx,
rules[rx].succeeding)
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181 logging.debug("RY Preceding Min Pos: %d" %
ry_preceding_min_pos)
182 logging.debug("RX Succeeding Max Pos: %d" %
rx_succeeding_max_pos)
183 #if rules[ry].pos > rx_succeeding_min_pos and rules[rx].pos
< ry_preceding_max_pos:
184 if rules[ry].pos > rx_succeeding_max_pos and rules[rx].pos
< ry_preceding_min_pos:
185 if rules[ry].prob < rules[rx].prob:
186 logging.debug("rules[ry], ry=%s: " % ry)
187 logging.debug(rules[ry])
188 logging.debug("rules[rx], rx=%s: " % rx)
189 logging.debug(rules[rx])
190 delta_new = (rules[rx].prob - rules[ry].prob) *
(rules[rx].pos - rules[ry].pos)
191 if delta_max < delta_new:
192 delta_max = delta_new
193 delta_max_rule = ry
194 logging.debug("delta_max(=%d) < delta_new, ry: %s"
% (delta_max, ry))
195 else:
196 logging.debug("rx has lower prob than ry")
197 else:
198 logging.debug("RY.pos is greater than
rx_succeeding_min_pos and RX.pos is less than
ry_preceding_max_pos")
199 if delta_max > 0:
200 print "swapping: " + rules[rx].rule + " and " +
rules[delta_max_rule].rule
201 swap(rules, rx, delta_max_rule)
202 else:
203 logging.debug("delta_max = %d" % delta_max)
204 continue
205 return delta_max
206
207 def print_rules(rules):
208 for r in rules:
209 attrs = vars(rules[r])
210 logging.debug(’, ’.join("%s: %s" % item for item in attrs.items()))
211
212 for r in (sorted(rules.values(), key=operator.attrgetter(’pos’))):
213 pprint.pprint(vars(r))
214
215 def init(filename_dep, filename_fw):
216 logging.debug("Program Start.")
217
218 filename = filename_dep
219 iptables_filename = filename_fw
220
221 rules, rules_list = read_DAG(filename)
222 iptables_preamble, iptables_rules = read_iptables(iptables_filename)
223 iptables_rules.pop() # remove the last element in the list
224
225 amte = 0 # average match time estimate
226 for rule in iptables_rules:
227 rid = get_id(rule)
228 rules[rid].rule = rule # set the rules field in the relevant object
229 amte += rules[rid].get_average_matching_time_estimate()
230
231 set_succeeding(rules)
232
233 print("The average Match Time Estimate for the initial firewall is:
%f" % amte)
234 return rules, iptables_preamble
235
236 #length = len(rules_list)
237 #for i in range(1):
238 # swapping(rules)
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239
240 def main():
241 parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="A firewall optimisation
algorithm utilising huristics and swapping")
242 parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", help="increase output
verbosity", action="store_true")
243 parser.add_argument("-f", "--filename", help="the firewall rules file
with precedece relationships", type=str, required=True)
244 parser.add_argument("-i", "--iptables-file", help="the iptables bash
script", type=str, required=True)
245 args = parser.parse_args()
246
247 if args.verbose:
248 #logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG, format=’%(asctime)s -
%(levelname)s - %(message)s’)
249 logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG, format=’%(asctime)s -
%(pathname)s - p%(process)s - %(levelname)s -
%(funcName)s:%(lineno)d - %(message)s’)
250
251 logging.debug("Program Start.")
252
253 filename = args.filename
254 iptables_filename = args.iptables_file
255
256 rules, rules_list = read_DAG(filename)
257 iptables_preamble, iptables_rules = read_iptables(iptables_filename)
258 iptables_rules.pop() # remove the last element in the list
259
260 for rule in iptables_rules:
261 rid = get_id(rule)
262 rules[rid].rule = rule # set the rules field in the relevant object
263
264 set_succeeding(rules)
265
266 #for r in (sorted(rules.values(), key=operator.attrgetter(’pos’))):
267 # pprint.pprint(vars(r))
268 #exit(0)
269
270 length = len(rules_list)
271 for i in range(1):
272 swapping(rules)
273
274 print "\nAfter swapping algorithm"
275 for r in rules:
276 attrs = vars(rules[r])
277 logging.debug(’, ’.join("%s: %s" % item for item in attrs.items()))
278
279 for r in (sorted(rules.values(), key=operator.attrgetter(’pos’))):
280 pprint.pprint(vars(r))
281
282 if __name__ == ’__main__’:
283 main()
Listing 7.7: "The final rule ordering program"
1 name,probability,precedence_relationships
2 A,0.05882352941,B,C
3 B,0.05882352941,D
4 C,0.05882352941,
5 D,0.05882352941,
6 E,0.05882352941,G,H
7 F,0.05882352941,G
8 G,0.05882352941,
9 H,0.05882352941,
10 I,0.05882352941,
11 J,0.05882352941,L
12 K,0.05882352941,L
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13 L,0.05882352941,
14 M,0.05882352941,
15 N,0.05882352941,O
16 O,0.05882352941,
17 P,0.05882352941,
18 Q,0.05882352941,
Listing 7.8: "Original Relationship file"
1 name,probability,precedence_relationships
2 A,0.125,B,C
3 B,0.125,D
4 C,0.125,
5 D,0.125,
6 E,0.125,G,H
7 F,0.125,G
8 G,0.125,
9 H,0.125,
Listing 7.9: "Small version of Relationship file"
Traffic Aware Program and Firewall Optimiser
This program contains both the weak estimator algorithm and code for
combining the rule ordering algorithm with the weak estimator algorithm
to create the optimised dynamic firewall setup.
1 #! /usr/bin/env python
2 import sys
3 import time
4 import datetime
5 import subprocess
6 import argparse
7 import logging
8 import re
9 import csv
10 import operator
11 import pprint
12
13 import rule_ordering
14
15 #glob_pkt_cnt_thrsh = 1000 # global packet count threshold
16 #glob_pkt_cnt_cur = 0 # current global packet count
17 glob_pkt_cnt_tot = 0 # total global packet count
18
19 #def write_avg_mtch_tme(tru_avg, est_avg, base_avg, filename):
20 # global glob_pkt_cnt_tot
21 # string = str(glob_pkt_cnt_tot) + "," + str(tru_avg) + "," +
str(est_avg) + "," + str(base_avg)
22 # print string
23 # #ts = time.time()
24 # #st = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(ts).strftime(’%Y-%m-%d_%H:%M:%S’)
25 # #filename = "average_matching_time_" + st + ".csv"
26 # with open(filename, ’a’) as f:
27 # f.write(string)
28 # f.write("\n")
29
30 def write_avg_mtch_tme(est_avg, filename):
31 global glob_pkt_cnt_tot
32 string = str(glob_pkt_cnt_tot) + "," + str(est_avg)
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33 print string
34 with open(filename, ’a’) as f:
35 f.write(string)
36 f.write("\n")
37
38 def find_trend(wndw):
39 wndw_len = len(wndw)
40 # find the average avg_mtch_tme of all elements except the latest
41 avg_avg_mtch_tme = sum(wndw[0:(wndw_len - 1)])/(wndw_len - 1)
42 # if the avg_avg_mtch_tme is 10% grater than the latest value
43 if (avg_avg_mtch_tme * 1.1) > wndw[-1]:
44 return True
45 return False
46 #def calc_average_match_time(rules, rules_obj, rules_zipf, static_fw,
filename):
47 # global glob_pkt_cnt_tot
48 # tru_avg_mtch_tme = 0
49 # est_avg_mtch_tme = 0
50 # base_avg_mtch_tme = 0
51 #
52 # lst = []
53 #
54 # # find tru_avg_mtch_tme for the whole firewall
55 # for r in rules_zipf:
56 # tru_avg_mtch_tme +=
rules_obj[r].get_average_matching_time_true(rules_zipf[r])
57 #
58 # # find est_avg_mtch_tme for the whole firewall
59 # for r in rules:
60 # est_avg_mtch_tme += rules_obj[r].get_average_matching_time_estimate()
61 #
62 # for r in static_fw:
63 # base_avg_mtch_tme += rules_zipf[r[0]] * r[1]
64 #
65 # print tru_avg_mtch_tme
66 # print est_avg_mtch_tme
67 # print base_avg_mtch_tme
68 # write_avg_mtch_tme(tru_avg_mtch_tme, est_avg_mtch_tme,
base_avg_mtch_tme, filename)
69
70 def calc_average_match_time(rules, rules_obj, filename):
71 est_avg_mtch_tme = 0
72
73 # find est_avg_mtch_tme for the whole firewall
74 for r in rules:
75 est_avg_mtch_tme +=
rules_obj[r].get_average_matching_time_estimate()
76
77 print est_avg_mtch_tme
78 write_avg_mtch_tme(est_avg_mtch_tme, filename)
79 return est_avg_mtch_tme
80
81 def read_DAG(filename):
82 rules = {} # empty dictionary of rules in the DAG
83 skip = True
84 with open(filename, ’rb’) as f:
85 for row in csv.reader(f):
86 if skip:
87 skip = False
88 continue
89 name = row[0]
90 prob = float(row[1])
91 pkts = 0 # initial value
92 lst = [prob, pkts]
93 rules[name] = lst
94 return rules
95
96 def get_pkts(rule):
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97 pattern = "^\s*([\d]+).* /\* ([\w]+) \*/"
98 regexp_obj = re.search(pattern, rule)
99 if regexp_obj:
100 return regexp_obj.group(1), regexp_obj.group(2)
101 else:
102 logging.debug("No match found for the pattern:")
103 logging.debug(pattern)
104 logging.debug("in line:")
105 logging.debug(rule)
106 return None, None
107
108 def read_iptables_stats():
109 process = subprocess.Popen([’iptables’, ’-xnvL’],
stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
110 out, err = process.communicate()
111 out = out.splitlines()
112 pkts_per_rule = {}
113 for line in out:
114 pkts, name = get_pkts(line)
115 if pkts and name:
116 pkts_per_rule[name] = int(pkts)
117 return pkts_per_rule
118
119 def rule_update(preamble, rules_obj, rules):
120 body = []
121 # simply overwrite the value list with an updated value list
122 for r in rules:
123 logging.debug("rules_obj[%s].prob: %f" % (r, rules_obj[r].prob))
124 logging.debug("rules[%s][0]: %f" % (r, rules[r][0]))
125 rules_obj[r].prob = rules[r][0]
126 # REMEBER THAT EACH TIME A NEW REORDER IS NEEDED ALL THE PACKET
STATS IN IPTABLES ARE RESET
127 # THIS MUST BE DONE IN THE CODE AS WELL.
128 tmp_lst = rules[r]
129 tmp_lst.pop()
130 tmp_lst.append(0)
131 rules[r] = tmp_lst
132
133 for i in range(10):
134 logging.debug("################### SWAPPING ITERATION: %d
#############################" % i)
135 delta_max = rule_ordering.swapping(rules_obj)
136 if delta_max <= 0: # there was no swap that happend in the last
iteration, we can return early
137 break
138
139 for r in (sorted(rules_obj.values(), key=operator.attrgetter(’pos’))):
140 #pprint.pprint(vars(r))
141 body.append(r.rule)
142
143 filename = rule_ordering.write_firewall(preamble, body)
144
145 process = subprocess.Popen([’bash’, filename], stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
146 out, err = process.communicate()
147
148 if err:
149 print err
150 exit(0)
151
152 def weak_estimator(rules, lmbda):
153 #global glob_pkt_cnt_cur
154 global glob_pkt_cnt_tot
155
156 my_sum = 0.0
157 for i in rules:
158 my_sum = my_sum + rules[i][0]
159 logging.debug("sum of rules: %f" % my_sum)
160
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161 # previous sample minus current sample to find how many packets have
been matched
162 # in total since the prevous sample.
163 pkts_per_rule = read_iptables_stats()
164
165 # calculate total amount of packet matches for last sample
166 M_old = 0
167 for v in rules.values():
168 M_tmp = v[1]
169 M_old += M_tmp
170 # calculate total amount of packet matches for current sample
171 M_new = sum(pkts_per_rule.values())
172 # calculate total amount of packet matches since the last sample
173 M = M_new - M_old
174 #glob_pkt_cnt_cur += M
175 glob_pkt_cnt_tot += M
176
177 if M > 0:
178 for rule in rules:
179 cur_prob = rules[rule][0]
180 cur_pkts = rules[rule][1]
181 upd_pkts = pkts_per_rule[rule]
182 M_i = float(upd_pkts - cur_pkts) # amount of packet matches since
last sample for one rule
183 upd_prob = cur_prob + (lmbda * (M_i/M - cur_prob))
184 logging.debug("Rule: %s\nprev_prob: %f\nprev_pkts: %d\ncur_pkts:
%d\nM_i: %d\n cur_prob: %f" %
185 (rule, cur_prob, cur_pkts, upd_pkts, M_i, upd_prob))
186 rules[rule] = [upd_prob, upd_pkts]
187 else:
188 logging.debug("nothing has happend since last sample, no need to do
anything")
189
190 def main():
191 #global glob_pkt_cnt_thrsh
192 #global glob_pkt_cnt_cur
193 global glob_pkt_cnt_tot
194
195 parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="A firewall optimisation
algorithm utilising huristics and swapping")
196 parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", help="increase output
verbosity", action="store_true")
197 parser.add_argument("-f", "--filename", help="the firewall rules file
with precedece relationships", type=str, required=True)
198 parser.add_argument("-fw", "--firewall", help="the iptables firewall
rules file", type=str, required=True)
199 parser.add_argument("-ws", "--window-size", help="window size of
rule", type=int, required=True)
200 args = parser.parse_args()
201
202 if args.verbose:
203 #logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG, format=’%(asctime)s -
%(levelname)s - %(message)s’)
204 logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG, format=’%(asctime)s -
%(pathname)s - p%(process)s - %(levelname)s -
%(funcName)s:%(lineno)d - %(message)s’)
205
206 logging.debug("Program Start.")
207
208 filename = args.filename
209 filename_fw = args.firewall
210
211 # initialise the rules dictionaries
212 rules_obj, iptables_preamble = rule_ordering.init(filename,
filename_fw) # dictionary of rules objects
213 logging.debug(rules_obj)
214 rules = read_DAG(filename)
215 initial_pkts_per_rule = read_iptables_stats()
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216 lmbda = 0.2
217 #weak_estimator(rules, lmbda)
218 for i in initial_pkts_per_rule:
219 cur_pkts = initial_pkts_per_rule[i]
220 tmp_lst = rules[i]
221 tmp_lst.pop()
222 tmp_lst.append(0)
223 rules[i] = tmp_lst
224
225 ####################################EXPERIMENT
CODE###################################################
226 # both zipf distributions are as long as the rules dict as long as the
smaller firewalls are used
227 #zipf_dist_X = [0.062132360042377745, 0.049922963174044155,
0.04149198453973711, 0.03534873454458779,
228 # 0.42862930043528075, 0.18657173946957867, 0.11469285134920415,
0.08121006644518972]
229
230 #zipf_dist_Y = [0.42862930043528075, 0.18657173946957867,
0.11469285134920415, 0.08121006644518972,
231 # 0.062132360042377745, 0.049922963174044155, 0.04149198453973711,
0.03534873454458779]
232
233 #zipf_dist_X = [0.05231293211266767, 0.04203311417119375,
0.034934571436956136, 0.029762203612392586,
234 # 0.3608885205692724, 0.1570858524343425, 0.09656673820770563,
0.06837558866128435,
235 # 0.025839378080981655, 0.022770526259177373, 0.020309622245726824,
0.018295975609411506,
236 # 0.016620383676689998, 0.015206155421475426, 0.013997921608126592,
0.012954751559851152,
237 # 0.012045764332744381]
238
239 #zipf_dist_Y = [0.1570858524343425, 0.029762203612392586,
0.05231293211266767, 0.018295975609411506,
240 # 0.06837558866128435, 0.012954751559851152, 0.034934571436956136,
0.020309622245726824,
241 # 0.012045764332744381, 0.025839378080981655, 0.09656673820770563,
0.3608885205692724,
242 # 0.022770526259177373, 0.016620383676689998, 0.013997921608126592,
0.04203311417119375,
243 # 0.015206155421475426]
244
245 #count = 0
246 #rules_zipf_X = {}
247 #rules_zipf_Y = {}
248 #static_fw = []
249 #for r in (sorted(rules_obj.values(), key=operator.attrgetter(’pos’))):
250 # static_tuple = (r.name, r.pos)
251 # static_fw.append(static_tuple)
252 # rules_zipf_X[r.name] = zipf_dist_X[count]
253 # rules_zipf_Y[r.name] = zipf_dist_Y[count]
254 # count += 1
255 #pprint.pprint(rules_zipf_X)
256 #pprint.pprint(rules_zipf_Y)
257 #pprint.pprint(static_fw)
258 #last_swap_avg_mtch_tme = 0
259 avg_mtch_tme_wndw = []
260 max_wndw_size = args.window_size
261 ts = time.time()
262 st = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(ts).strftime(’%Y-%m-%d_%H:%M:%S’)
263 log_filename = "performance_triggered_experiment_wndw_size_" +
str(max_wndw_size) + "_" + st + ".csv"
264 ####################################EXPERIMENT
CODE###################################################
265
266 #last_swap_avg_mtch_tme = calc_average_match_time(rules, rules_obj,
log_filename)
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267 try:
268 while True:
269 weak_estimator(rules, lmbda)
270 logging.debug("After estimation")
271 logging.debug(rules)
272 #rule_update(iptables_preamble, rules_obj, rules)
273 #print("\ncur packet count: %d\ntotal packet count: %d" %
(glob_pkt_cnt_cur, glob_pkt_cnt_tot))
274 #if glob_pkt_cnt_cur >= glob_pkt_cnt_thrsh:
275 tmp_avg_mtch_tme = calc_average_match_time(rules, rules_obj,
log_filename)
276 length = len(avg_mtch_tme_wndw)
277 if length < max_wndw_size:
278 avg_mtch_tme_wndw.append(tmp_avg_mtch_tme)
279 else:
280 avg_mtch_tme_wndw.pop(0) # fifo list, first in first out, we
only want the lates values
281 avg_mtch_tme_wndw.append(tmp_avg_mtch_tme)
282
283 if length == max_wndw_size and find_trend(avg_mtch_tme_wndw): #
return true if trend is increasing, else false
284 rule_update(iptables_preamble, rules_obj, rules)
285 # glob_pkt_cnt_cur = 0
286
287 #if glob_pkt_cnt_tot >= 10000:
288 # calc_average_match_time(rules, rules_obj, rules_zipf_Y,
static_fw, log_filename)
289 #else:
290 # calc_average_match_time(rules, rules_obj, rules_zipf_X,
static_fw, log_filename)
291
292 #if glob_pkt_cnt_tot >= 20000:
293 # print "20000 packets matched, experiment over"
294 # exit(0)
295 time.sleep(2)
296 except KeyboardInterrupt:
297 print "exiting the program"
298 exit(0)
299
300 if __name__ == ’__main__’:
301 main()
Listing 7.10: "The final traffic aware program"
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